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CONGRESS’S DOMAIN:
APPROPRIATIONS, TIME, AND CHEVRON
MATTHEW B. LAWRENCE†
ABSTRACT
Annual appropriations and permanent appropriations play
contradictory roles in the separation of powers. Annual appropriations
preserve agencies’ need for congressionally provided funding and
enforce a domain of congressional influence over agency action in
which the House and the Senate each enforce written unicameral
commands through the threat of reduced appropriations in the next
annual cycle. Permanent appropriations permit agencies to fund their
programs without ongoing congressional support, circumscribing and
diluting Congress’s domain.
The unanswered question of Chevron deference for appropriations
demonstrates the importance of the distinction between annual
appropriations and permanent appropriations. Uncritical application
of governing deference tests that emphasize the time and procedural
steps an agency put into an interpretation would tend to favor deference
for agency interpretations of permanent appropriations, but not for
annual appropriations. Yet this result is upside-down if courts’ goal is
to promote accountability and avoid interference with the balance of
power between the political branches. Chevron has two core functions,
a subdelegation function (it transfers the authority delegated in
ambiguities from courts to agencies) and an anti-entrenchment
function (it relieves interpretations of the solidifying force of stare
decisis). As applied to annual appropriations, both functions respect
Congress’s primary role in enforcement through the appropriations
cycle; as applied to permanent appropriations, both functions interfere
with Congress’s domain.
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Courts that evaluate Chevron for appropriations without
acknowledging and addressing the elemental difference between
annual appropriations and permanent appropriations interfere with the
political branches and frustrate Congress’s expectations. Courts should
adopt a bifurcated approach to Chevron for appropriations that
disfavors deference for permanent appropriations provisions, but not
for annual appropriations provisions. This Article suggests how the
distinction between annual and permanent appropriations may be
relevant to the incorporation of appropriations into other aspects of
administrative law doctrine, including legislative standing,
reviewability, and nondelegation.
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INTRODUCTION
“Unless they[’re] paying your bills, pay them . . . no mind.”1
—RuPaul
“The Congress shall have Power . . . To raise and support Armies, but
no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term
than two Years.”2
—United States Constitution

In my house, we have our five-year-old feed the dogs. Our
reasoning will be intuitive to any pet owner. Pets naturally respect the
“hand that feeds,” aware that anyone who they count on for food has
a ready means of punishing disobedience—through the stomach. But
pets feel no such gastronomic compulsion to obey those who they do
not count on for their daily meals. “[H]unger changes worlds.”3
This simple metaphor is critical for understanding the
contradictory roles of annual appropriations and permanent
appropriations in the separation of powers context. The Constitution
prohibits federal spending without an “appropriation”—legislation
specifying an amount and source of funds for an agency to use for a
designated purpose.4 Much like a pet obeys a master on whom it
depends for daily meals, agencies dependent upon annual
appropriations obey both houses of Congress because each must
consent to enact such appropriations.5 Through this “hands that feed”

1.
2.
3.
4.

RUPAUL, Sissy That Walk, on BORN NAKED (RuCo Inc. 2014).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
CARL SANDBURG, 75, in THE PEOPLE, YES 196, 196 (First Harvest ed. 1990).
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-464SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW ch. 2, at 2-23 to 2-24 (4th ed. 2016) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF
APPROPRIATIONS LAW], https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675709.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VBUASJ5]; see, e.g., United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding
that funds appropriated for providing free transcripts could only be spent for that purpose when
expressly authorized by statute).
5. U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2, § 9, cl. 7.
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dynamic, Congress has made annual appropriations a domain where
the House of Representatives and the Senate have enduring,
independent power and in which each house enforces compliance with
“law”—including unicameral texts that no court would enforce even if
it had the time to exercise review—through the threat of retribution in
the appropriations cycle.6 On the other hand, permanent
appropriations provisions play a destructive role in this dynamic. They
give agencies a way to feed themselves without, or, even despite, the
House and Senate, thus shrinking and diluting Congress’s domain.
Annual and permanent appropriations are essentially opposites—
matter and anti-matter, fire and water—in the separation of powers.7
One preserves what the other destroys: namely, agencies’ underlying,
recurring need for funds that only the mutual assent of both the House
and Senate can provide.8
This distinction between annual appropriations, which preserve
congressional power, and permanent appropriations, which destroy it,
was well understood to the Framers. The Constitution explicitly
prohibits permanent and future appropriations for the army,9 a
provision the Framers included to secure an ongoing check on the use
of military force for popular majorities (who get to elect a new House
every two years), no matter what their predecessors might have
enacted into law.10 The two-year clause keeps the use of military force
6. See infra Part II.A (describing how agencies and Congress treat appropriations
committee reports, conference reports, and budget justifications as binding legal texts).
7. Annual and permanent appropriations are not precisely opposites—the “essentially”
here glosses over subtleties to make a systemic point. From the standpoint of future congresses,
permanent appropriations take away power over the particular programs they fund; but from the
standpoint of the congress that enacts a permanent appropriation, doing so increases power over
the policies that will be in place in the future. Moreover, the specific impact of annual
appropriations depends on the program to be funded—if future congresses “like” an annually
funded program that their President “dislikes,” then the power generated by the annual funding
stream may well inure to the President. Cf. Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric
Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 915, 961–64 (2020) (noting that Republicans’
preference for limited government can mean they draw more power from threat of government
shutdown than Democrats do).
8. Congress can also play a role in generating agencies’ underlying needs for funds, thereby
increasing its power. See Matthew B. Lawrence, Disappropriation, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17–21,
27–28 (2020) [hereinafter Lawrence, Disappropriation] (explaining that Congress can use
legislative conduct and spending commitments to create a future need for funds to honor those
commitments).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
10. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 24, at 158 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(describing limiting durations of appropriations for the army as an “important qualification even
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forever within Congress’s domain. But despite the constitutional
pedigree of the temporal distinction between annual and permanent
appropriations, it is underappreciated in contemporary doctrine11 and
scholarship.12 This is a symptom of administrative law’s longstanding
failure to, in Professor Gillian Metzger’s words, “take appropriations
seriously.”13
This Article explains the contrasting effects of annual (and other
near-term) and permanent (and other future) appropriations
provisions on the separation of powers.14 It then demonstrates how this
distinction can be determinative in incorporating appropriations into
administrative law doctrine by addressing the unresolved question of
how Chevron15 applies to appropriations. Blockbuster lawsuits about
the construction of a wall along the southern border16 and the

of the legislative discretion” which, “upon a nearer view of it will appear to be a great and real
security against military establishments without evident necessity”); Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A.
Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. L. REV. 543, 549 (2007) (“[T]he Military
Appropriations Clause necessitates a repeated declaration by the legislature that the
appropriation is necessary.”).
11. See infra Part III.B (describing cases applying Chevron to appropriations provisions
without regard to their duration).
12. Prior scholarship has acknowledged the distinctive congressional role in the annual
appropriations process as well as the fact that permanent appropriations provisions diminish legislative
power, but has not developed the annual versus permanent appropriations distinction or its doctrinal
implications. See, e.g., JAMES WALLNER, TESTIMONY: “EXAMINING ‘BACKDOOR’ SPENDING BY
FEDERAL AGENCIES,” SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS 8 (Dec. 11, 2018), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/
GO04/20181211/108786/HHRG-115-GO04-Wstate-WallnerJ-20181211.pdf [https://perma.cc/B598G8G5] (noting that congressional influence is diminished if an “agency’s funding d[oes] not require
congressional approval”); Alan L. Feld, The Shrunken Power of the Purse, 89 B.U. L. REV. 487, 494
(2009) (“Permanent appropriations constrain Congress’s ability to review and change priorities
through the appropriation process.”); Peter L. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A
Comment on the Supreme Court’s Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789, 813 (“The
enforcement of budgetary limitations is almost wholly internal to the political branches of
government, and a matter of intense and appropriate congressional interest.”).
13. See Gillian Metzger, Taking Appropriations Seriously, 121 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming
2021) (manuscript at 1) (on file with author).
14. The distinction between permanent and future appropriations provisions, on the one
hand, and annual and other near-term appropriations, on the other, is described infra Part I.A.
15. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
16. Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 692 (9th Cir. 2019) (refusing to grant Chevron
deference when determining meaning of an appropriations transfer provision, despite silence
about deference from government).
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Affordable Care Act’s (“ACA”) health insurance subsidies17 have
recently brought the question of whether courts should defer to
agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous appropriations to the fore. Yet
the federal appellate courts have not definitively resolved it. District
courts have taken contradictory approaches,18 and legal scholarship has
offered little guidance.19
The distinction between annual and permanent appropriations is
pivotal to evaluating doctrinal paths forward for the unresolved
question of Chevron’s applicability to appropriations law. Unmindful
application of the Supreme Court’s governing, if indeterminate, Mead20
test for appropriations provisions favors deference for permanent
appropriations but not for annual appropriations. This is because
permanent appropriations are more likely to be included in a measure
specific to one agency and are on the books long enough for agencies
to interpret them through notice-and-comment rulemaking. But, as
this Article explains, this result is upside-down if courts’ goal is
avoiding interference with the balance of power between the legislative
and the executive branches. Chevron has two core functions: a
subdelegation function, which transfers the authority delegated in
ambiguities from courts to agencies; and an anti-entrenchment
function, which relieves interpretations of the solidifying force of stare
decisis. Applied to annual appropriations, both functions respect
Congress’s primary role in enforcing appropriations law. Applied to
permanent appropriations, both functions undermine Congress’s
domain.
Courts that evaluate Chevron for appropriations without
acknowledging and addressing the elemental difference between
annual and permanent appropriations interfere with the political
branches and frustrate Congress’s likely expectations. Courts that are
cognizant of appropriations provisions’ distinctive role within the
separation of powers should address the confusion that surrounds
17. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 188 (D.D.C. 2016)
(refusing government’s request for Chevron deference in determining availability of permanent
appropriations to honor legislative commitment).
18. See infra Part III.B (surveying cases).
19. No article has squarely confronted the applicability of Chevron to appropriations
provisions. The article that comes the closest is Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and Deference: Agencies,
Spending, and Economic Rights, 66 DUKE L.J. 1677 (2017). However, that article addresses only
deference to agency interpretations that create binding legal commitments, not agency
interpretations of appropriations law. For an explanation of the distinction between legal
commitments and appropriations, see Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 8, at 10–21.
20. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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Chevron’s applicability to appropriations by employing the bifurcated
approach developed in this Article. This approach disfavors deference
for permanent appropriations provisions but not annual
appropriations provisions.
This Article’s contribution is descriptive, doctrinal, normative,
and prescriptive. Its descriptive contribution is to elaborate on the role
of annual appropriations in preserving and supporting an oftenoverlooked domain of legislatively enforced law governing agencies
and on the role of permanent appropriations in curbing and diluting
Congress’s domain. Its doctrinal contribution is to map courts’
confusion in deciding whether to treat agencies’ interpretations of
ambiguous appropriations provisions as binding; that is, in deciding
whether to apply Chevron to appropriations. Its normative
contribution is to argue that the effects of applying Chevron to
appropriations depend critically on whether the interpreted provision
is annual (or near term) or permanent (or future term). Finally, its
prescriptive contribution is to argue, in light of all of this, that courts
and scholars incorporating appropriations into administrative law
doctrine should begin with the elemental distinction between annual
appropriations and permanent appropriations.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes appropriations
concepts and practices that are helpful in understanding the separation
of powers and doctrinal questions appropriations present. It describes
the anatomy of a typical statutory appropriation and the outer
boundaries of what constitutes an “appropriation.” It also elaborates
on the distinction between annual (and other near-term)
appropriations and permanent (and other future-term) appropriations.
Part II explains how annual appropriations preserve and enforce
a domain of unicameral “law” governing administrative agency
behavior. This domain includes texts no court would enforce but that
agencies and Congress treat as binding, including appropriations
committee reports, conference reports, and budget justifications. Part
II also explains how permanent appropriations provisions circumscribe
and dilute this domain of enduring congressional influence.
Part III demonstrates the doctrinal importance of the distinction
between annual and permanent appropriations provisions through the
example of Chevron for appropriations. It summarizes the doctrinal
confusion surrounding Chevron’s applicability to appropriations,
detailing the inconsistent approaches taken by the few courts to
address this question. These approaches demonstrate that
appropriations do not fit readily into the literal terms of governing
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doctrinal tests. It then argues for a bifurcated approach that hinges
deference on whether an appropriations provision is annual or
permanent. Among other benefits, this bifurcated approach avoids
interference with the separation of powers—it respects Congress’s
domain.
Finally, a brief conclusion summarizes the Article’s contribution
and reflects on the broader implications of the elemental distinction
between annual and permanent appropriations for administrative law
doctrine. It suggests, based on this distinction, future inquiry into
whether Congress can delegate the appropriations power to the
executive branch in permanent law, the applicability of the Supreme
Court’s holding that lump-sum appropriations are committed by law to
agency discretion to long-term appropriations provisions, and the
relevance of the duration of appropriations provisions to the legislative
standing debate.
I. WHAT IS AN “APPROPRIATION”?
Founding-era documents emphasize the Framers’ expectation that
Congress’s appropriations power would play a critical role in the
separation of powers.21 Contemporary courts and commentators have
validated that expectation.22 Yet, while the fact that appropriations are

21. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 466 (1796) (statement of Rep. Gallatin) (“[T]he general power
of granting money, also vested in Congress, would at all events be used, if necessary, as a check
upon, and as controlling the exercise of the powers claimed by the President and Senate.”). The
significance of the “power of the purse”—while encompassing more than simply appropriations,
see Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 8, at 11–12—was couched in terms equally applicable
to the appropriations power:
The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose the
supplies requisite for the support of government. They, in a word, hold the purse . . . [,]
the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the
immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance,
and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, supra note 10, at 359 (James Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST NO.
30, supra note 10, at 188 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital
principle of the body politic; as that which sustains its life and motion and enables it to perform
its most essential functions.”). For an excellent overview of the importance of the power of the
purse to the Framers, see generally JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION, LEGISLATIVE
AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2017).
22. See Off. of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 425 (1990) (“Any exercise of a power
granted by the Constitution to one of the other branches of Government is limited by a valid
reservation of congressional control over funds in the Treasury.”); U.S. Dep’t of the Navy v.
FLRA, 665 F.3d 1339, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“The power over the purse was one of the most
important authorities allocated to Congress in the Constitution’s [separation of powers] . . . .”);
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important to the separation of powers is well-known, the actual nature
and role of appropriations are poorly understood.
What is an appropriation? Is the Medicare statute an
appropriation? Is the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits the use of
federal funds for abortion,23 an appropriation? And what do
appropriations do for Congress when a shutdown is not threatened, or
during periods when the president, House, and Senate are controlled
by the same party?
Section A details the anatomy of a legislative appropriation,
including key terms. Section B describes the fuzzy edges—and the clear
center—of the “appropriations law” category. Section C discusses
appropriations procedure.
A. Anatomy of a Statutory Appropriation
The Appropriations Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the
expenditure of funds from the treasury except “in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law.”24 This means that even if a law
commands an agency to expend funds, the agency that is subject to that
command cannot comply—must break the law—unless Congress has
also enacted an “appropriation” permitting the expenditure.25
Congressional rules refer to laws that permit or require spending as
“authorizations” and laws that appropriate the funds necessary to
actually spend as “appropriations,” though an appropriation need not
be preceded by an authorization to be constitutionally effective.26
Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions and Separation of Powers, 71 VAND. L. REV. 357, 360
(2018) (describing “Congress’s . . . authority to deny access to public funds” as “one of its most
essential constitutional authorities”); id. at 367–68 (“Through the ingenious practice, begun with
the very first Congress, of appropriating funds only one year at a time, Congress has ensured that
presidents must always come back every year seeking money just to keep the government’s lights
on.”).
23. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302 (1980).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
25. See United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he
expenditure of public funds is proper only when authorized by Congress . . . .”); Cincinnati Soap
Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937) (“[N]o money can be paid out of the Treasury unless
it has been appropriated by an act of Congress.”); Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 291
(1851) (“It is a well-known constitutional provision, that no money can be taken or drawn from
the Treasury except under an appropriation by Congress.”). See generally Lawrence,
Disappropriation, supra note 8, at 47–61 (exploring what happens when Congress fails to
appropriate funds necessary to honor a prior legislative commitment).
26. See Amanda Chuzi, Note, Defense Lawmaking, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 997–1004
(2020) (describing interplay of authorizations and appropriations).
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Amount, source, purpose. To be an “appropriation,” there first
must be a legislative enactment passed by both Houses and either not
vetoed or with any veto overridden.27 The enactment must specify a
source of funds, an amount of funds (which may be written in definite
terms or indefinite terms), and a purpose for which the specified funds
are to be used.28 In the early twentieth century, Congress clarified that
the making of an appropriation must be explicit; it cannot be inferred29
Funding restrictions. Laws often specify not only a purpose for
which funds may be used, but also purposes for which funds may not
be used. For example, a law could state that funds may be used “for
vehicles in the park, but not for bicycles.” Explicit limitations on the
purpose for which funds may be used are known as “funding
restrictions,”30 though the law’s affirmative statement of purpose also
naturally restricts the purposes to which funds may be put.31 The Hyde
Amendment, which limits the use of federal funds for abortion, is
perhaps the most famous funding restriction.32 President Barack
Obama’s effort to close Guantanamo Bay,33 the use of cost-benefit
analysis in regulatory review during the Reagan administration,34 and
ending military activity in Vietnam have all been the subject of funding
restrictions.35 Given their long historical pedigree and the fact that they
act as direct statements of an appropriation’s purpose, it is hard to

27. PRINCIPLES OF APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 4, at 2-59.
28. Id. at 2-24, 2-57.
29. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3914 § 9, 34 Stat. 764 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.
§ 1301(d)).
30. These restrictions are often strategically deployed as limitation riders “[w]hen no other
legislative device is available.” Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through
Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456, 464.
31. Cf. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“Where
Congress has addressed the subject as it has here, and authorized expenditures where a condition
is met, the clear implication is that where the condition is not met, the expenditure is not
authorized.”).
32. Devins, supra note 30, at 466 (describing the Hyde Amendment as “an ingrained part of
the appropriations landscape”). See generally Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (addressing
the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment).
33. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. C, tit. VIII,
§§ 8110–8111, 128 Stat. 86, 131–32.
34. Judith Havemann, ‘Defunding’ OMB’s Rule Reviewers, WASH. POST, July 18, 1986, at
A17.
35. DAVID J. BARRON, WAGING WAR: THE CLASH BETWEEN PRESIDENTS AND
CONGRESS, 1776 TO ISIS 343–44, 350 (2016) (discussing use of funding restrictions and denials in
the Vietnam conflict).
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argue that funding restrictions are not themselves part of the
underlying “appropriation.”
Conditional funding authorities. Analogous to funding restrictions,
some enactments expand or alter the purpose to which a designated
amount might be put under certain specified conditions.36 There is not
a consistent terminology for such provisions in appropriations law. I
refer to them here as “conditional funding authorities.” The
conditional funding authority in 10 U.S.C. § 2808, for example, permits
the use of certain military funds for certain construction purposes if the
president has declared an emergency that “requires use of the armed
forces” and the secretary of defense deems such construction to be
“necessary to support such use.”37
Transfer authorities. Relatedly, some enactments direct that some
or all of the amount designated for one purpose be used for another
purpose under certain specified conditions.38 Such “transfer
authorities” might be thought of as negatively intertwined conditional
funding authorities: one of these reduces the amount available for a
purpose under certain conditions and the other increases the amount
available for a different purpose by a corresponding amount under
those same conditions—like a seesaw. The transfer authority in § 8005
of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2019, for
example, permits the transfer of certain Department of Defense
(“DOD”) funds for use in counternarcotics operations if the secretary
believes it necessary and if she has not already requested and been
denied such funds from Congress.39
Period of availability (time). Appropriations provisions—
statements of an amount, source, and purpose; funding restrictions;
conditional funding authorities; and transfer authorities may have
varying periods of availability or applicability. Approximately half of
federal spending is controlled by annual appropriations provisions that
the law provides will become available either at enactment or for the

36. Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget Powers in the Trump Era, in EXECUTIVE
POLICYMAKING: THE ROLE OF THE OMB IN THE PRESIDENCY 69, 78–79 (Meena Bose & Andrew
Rudalevige eds., 2020) [hereinafter Pasachoff, The President’s Budget Powers].
37. 10 U.S.C. § 2808 (2018).
38. Pasachoff, The President’s Budget Powers, supra note 36, at 78–79.
39. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245, div. A, tit. VIII,
§ 8005, 132 Stat. 2982, 2999.
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very next fiscal year, and expire (or lapse) within a year or two.40 The
rest is controlled by permanent appropriations provisions, which never
expire, or provisions that the law makes available or applicable for
some future period well after enactment. For example, the ACA
appropriated billions for Medicare innovation, for each of the ten years
following the law’s enactment.41
Definite versus indefinite. Usually appropriations set an amount of
funding that is “definite”—that is, capped at a specific amount like
“$1 million” or “$100 billion.” Some appropriations are “indefinite,”
though, meaning they are uncapped and permit the expenditure of
however much is necessary to satisfy their associated purpose.42 The
Social Security Act’s primary appropriation is indefinite: it simply
makes funds from the Trust Fund available to satisfy obligations
incurred in the Social Security program.43 Similarly, the Judgment
Fund appropriation Congress established to satisfy court judgments is
also indefinite.44 Indefinite appropriations tend to be found in
permanent law.
B. When Is an Appropriation Not an Appropriation (And When Is
Ordinary Legislation Actually an Appropriation)?
Three further issues in defining categories require attention up
front. First, of course, a measure that creates an appropriation, whether
an annual appropriation or a permanent one, can include provisions
that have nothing to do with the appropriation at issue. In budget
speak, these are referred to as “general provisions.”45 For example, the
Fiscal Year 2010 appropriations act included a general provision
“requir[ing] all federal agencies to have a written policy for ensuring a
drug-free workplace.”46 This Article does not squarely address the
40. Though approximately two-thirds of federal spending is considered “mandatory” in the
sense that Congress has no choice but to allocate funding, a significant fraction of this
“mandatory” spending is in fact subject to annual appropriations. See Lawrence,
Disappropriation, supra note 8, at 22.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1115A (2018).
42. See PRINCIPLES OF APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 4, at 2-10.
43. John Harrison, New Property, Entrenchment, and the Fiscal Constitution, in FISCAL
CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY ch. 13, at 401, 404
(Elizabeth Garrett, Elizabeth A. Graddy & Howell E. Jackson eds., 2008) (describing Social
Security financing structure).
44. 31 U.S.C.A. § 1304 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-158).
45. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., 98-648, APPROPRIATIONS BILLS: WHAT ARE “GENERAL
PROVISIONS”? 1 (2010).
46. Id.
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interpretation of general provisions that do not describe how funds
may be used, and it leaves the extent to which its analysis applies to
general provisions to other articles. Although such provisions are part
of an “appropriation measure” in a limited formal sense, in other
formal senses they are not (namely, they are connected to an
appropriation only by the measure that carries them), and they are not
at all part of an “appropriation” in a functional sense.
Second, many appropriations provisions incorporate other
provisions of law by reference, either explicitly or implicitly. In such a
case, interpreting the incorporated underlying provision can itself, in a
sense, change the generosity of the appropriation or the purposes it
may be put toward. For example, the permanent, indefinite
appropriation for refundable tax credits is available for “refunds due
from credit provisions” of the tax code,47 such as the now-expired
refundable tax credit for Build America Bonds48 or the ACA’s
premium tax credits.49 Thus, an interpretation of the underlying law
creating those credits would affect the generosity of the appropriation.
King v. Burwell50 illustrates this. Because the refundable tax credit
appropriation is permanent and indefinite, the Supreme Court’s
decision about the meaning of the ACA’s tax credit provision had
direct consequences for the purposes for which the tax credit
appropriation would be available and the amount expended through
that appropriation.51
To some extent, the separation of powers issues surrounding
permanent appropriations discussed in Part II apply as well to
interpretations of statutory terms incorporated by reference in
appropriations. That said, this Article does not consider such crossreferenced provisions to be “appropriation” provisions unless
Congress itself gives them this label. This respects the distinction
between “authorizing” legislation, which may permit or compel
spending, and “appropriations,” which provide the constitutional
permission to spend that is fundamental to appropriations law and

47. 31 U.S.C. § 1324(b)(2) (2018).
48. See Blaine G. Saito, Building a Better America: Tax Expenditure Reform and the Case of
State and Local Government Bonds and Build America Bonds, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 577,
580 (2013) (describing the Build America Bonds program).
49. 31 U.S.C. § 1324(b)(2) (indicating I.R.C. § 36B as one such credit provision).
50. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015).
51. See id. at 496–98.
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practice.52 Moreover, Congress often chooses to provide for spending
in one law while providing the necessary appropriations in another, and
this “dissonance” itself has important implications for the separation
of powers.53 Conflating individual spending provisions with their
associated appropriations would collapse this distinction and vitiate
Congress’s choice to make them distinct. The doctrinal
recommendations described in Part III, for operational reasons and out
of respect for Congress’s labeling choices, encompass spending
provisions in permanent law that happen to be incorporated by
reference in an appropriation only to a limited extent. This Article’s
core focus is therefore on provisions that are both formally and
functionally appropriations provisions: with amount, source, and
affirmative purpose statements; funding restrictions; conditional
funding authorities; and transfer authorities.
Third, the domain of “appropriations law” includes more than
appropriations provisions themselves. This term is also used to
describe framework statutes that regulate agencies’ and Congress’s
behavior regarding various fiscal issues, including spending and
entering contracts. One such framework statute, for example, is the
Antideficiency Act, which creates criminal penalties for spending
without an appropriation. The Government Accountability Office
(“GAO”), the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”), and the
Department of Justice have a significant role in detecting
noncompliance with these laws and enforcing them.54 This Article does
not squarely address these framework statutes.
C. Appropriations Procedure?
Appropriations themselves are made by Congress through
legislation. But agencies must implement them, obligating funds and

52. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-734SP, A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED
FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 13, 15, 21 (2005), https://www.gao.gov/assets/80/76911.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4X5Y-MURP]; Use of Appropriated Funds To Provide Light Refreshments to
Non-Fed. Participants at EPA Confs., 31 Op. O.L.C. 54, 62–71 (2007) (drawing a line based on
Congress’s choice whether to tie a restriction to the appropriations provision or not).
53. See generally Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 8 (explaining how Congress’s
ability to create “permanent but temporarily funded commitments” has implications for the
separation of powers).
54. See PRINCIPLES OF APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 4, at 2-56 to 2-81.
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ultimately “draw[ing] money from the Treasury.”55 What process do
agencies follow in making such decisions?
As Metzger explains, a “lack of statutorily-mandated procedure
surrounds . . . administrative decisions on appropriations.”56 This is due
in large part to the fact that the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”) exempts matters “relating to agency management or
personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts”
from notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements.57
In practice, agencies take all sorts of approaches to implementing
and interpreting appropriations, mindful largely of substantive
expectations and requirements of the GAO and OMB,58 not
procedural requirements such as those created by the APA. The same
is true of presidential oversight. Though OMB’s tools to influence
agency budget execution are in some ways stronger than its tools
through the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs to influence
regulatory activity, the exercise of those tools is not subject to the same
transparency or procedural requirements.59 I am unaware of any
systemic study of agency practice in this area. We should be careful not
to infer that the appropriations interpretations in published cases are
representative. Public accounts offer examples of agencies sometimes
putting their appropriations interpretations through notice-andcomment rulemaking, but other times sharing interpretations only
internally.60
II. CONGRESS’S DOMAIN
A reader trained in ordinary federal legislation and regulation and
armed with a working understanding of the basic components of
55. U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 9, cl. 7.
56. See Metzger, supra note 13 (manuscript at 33).
57. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2018).
58. See PRINCIPLES OF APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 4, at 2-30 to 2-36 (discussing
requirements for agencies when they exercise discretion); OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR
NO. A-11 25-1 (2019), https://budgetcounsel.files.wordpress.com/2019/08/2019-omb-circular-a-11full-june-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/W78L-VMNE].
59. See Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125
YALE L.J. 2182, 2287 (2016) [hereinafter Pasachoff, Agency Policy Control].
60. E.g., Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence—At OIRA and Beyond, 103
GEO. L.J. 259, 269 (2015) (describing the “often internally facing work” on “a wide variety of
interpretive tasks”); cf. Pasachoff, Agency Policy Control, supra note 59, at 2224 (describing
“limits [on] agencies’ ability to state publicly their own views of alternative budget and policy
priorities”).
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appropriations would find the actual workings of the appropriations
process byzantine and incomprehensible. This is because when it
comes to the annual appropriations process, statutory appropriations
themselves are just the tip of the iceberg.
Section A describes how annual appropriations preserve a domain
of appropriations “law” beyond judicial cognizance and often confuse
courts and commenters.61 In this domain, each chamber enforces
commands in documents and portions of documents that are not “law,”
constitutionally speaking, and that could not be enforced in courts.
Section B describes how permanent appropriations shrink this domain
of congressional influence. Section C explains how discretionary
permanent appropriations also dilute Congress’s influence within its
domain.
A terminology note: The diminution in congressional power
associated with permanent appropriations is not all or nothing; the
further an appropriations provision extends from its date of enactment,
the greater the diminution. This Article uses the terminology of
“annual” and “permanent” because that terminology is common in
appropriations law and practice today, and these are the most common
forms of appropriations provisions. That said, its analysis of annual
appropriations applies to other near-term appropriations and its
analysis of permanent appropriations applies to other future
appropriations.
A. Annual Appropriations Preserve the Domain of Congressionally
Enforced Appropriations Law
The fact that many appropriations are available for only one year
is critical because it gives both the House of Representatives and the
Senate an effective veto over funding for programs subject to annual
appropriations, and, therefore, gives them an enduring source of power
over agencies. Statutes creating agencies or empowering them to
perform functions are entrenched upon enactment. A majority that

61. The label of “law” for these written sublegislative commands is not load-bearing for any
of the analysis that follows, and the label would be controversial in the view of many legal
theorists. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice,
61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 579 (2008) (using the term “soft law” to refer to rules that are not strictly
law but “produce the same behavioral effects”); Edward K. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 374–75, 377 & n.25 (1989) (discussing competing
conceptions of what makes a written directive “law”). See generally Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin
M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1239, 1244–45 (2017) (describing
internal executive branch rules as law).
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becomes opposed to these statutes has a diminished hope of forcing
change because amending a statute requires not just the approval of
the majoritarian House of Representatives (elected by the people
every two years) but also the countermajoritarian Senate (two per state
elected in staggered six-year terms regardless of state population) and
the countermajoritarian electoral college (representatives apportioned
by state, based largely but not entirely on population). But agencies’
need for funding through the annual appropriations process recurs
every year, so each newly elected House or Senate has the opportunity
to block an agency or program’s funding. This one-house veto not only
empowers Congress, it also empowers the majorities that elect a new
House of Representatives every two years. In short, as it was put at the
time of the ratification, the federal purse has “two strings, one of which
[i]s in the hands of the H. of Reps.”62 To release funds, “[b]oth houses
must concur.”63 The Framers understood this dynamic to be key to the
potency of the power of the purse.64
Scholarship describing the power Congress wields through
appropriations sometimes focuses on statutory enactments, including
funding restrictions,65 as well as the leverage Congress has in
negotiations with the president over legislation, which it gets from its
ability to threaten a “shutdown.”66 However, it is important not to
overlook another thread of scholarship explaining how Congress uses
the threat of reduced appropriations to exert influence over agencies.
Congress uses its power to refuse funding to force agencies to
comply with appropriations “laws,” including not only the legislative
enactments described in Part I but also certain legal materials that are
not part of valid legislation and could not be enforced in court. As
described below, these include budget justifications, committee
reports, and transfer and reprogramming pre-approval requirements.
62. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 275 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
63. Id.; see also 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 329–30 (photo. reprt. 1941)
(2d ed. 1836) (statement of Charles Pinckney) (“The House of Representatives . . . [is] the
moving-spring of the system . . . . [O]n them depend the appropriations of money, and
consequently all the arrangements of government.”); U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin,
976 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“To put it simply, the Appropriations Clause requires two keys
to unlock the Treasury, and the House holds one of those keys.”).
64. Supra note 21 and accompanying text.
65. E.g., Devins, supra note 30, at 456–57.
66. See, e.g., Pasachoff, Agency Policy Control, supra note 59, at 2232–34.
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All of these legal materials are effective in controlling the behavior of
agencies because each house of Congress enforces them through the
threat of sanction in future annual appropriations enactments—today,
they primarily rely on the Appropriations Committees to do so.67
Budget justifications. Congress and the president have developed
a sequenced budget process that unfolds each year through which
annual appropriations for the upcoming fiscal year are considered and
ultimately enacted.68 The first step in this process is for the president to
submit their proposed budget to Congress, which includes proposed
language for each appropriations provision the president recommends
Congress enact. Along with this proposed language, the president
submits a lengthy appendix including justifications of how each agency
expects to spend from the amount requested.69 When Congress enacts
appropriations as requested and without modification, it “expect[s]
agencies to adhere to their budget justifications to the extent

67. ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 271 (3d ed. 2007)
(“What gives the appropriations reports special force is not their legal status but the fact that the
next appropriations cycle is always less than one year away. An agency that willfully violates report
language risks retribution the next time it asks for money.”); see also Jesse M. Cross, When Courts
Should Ignore Statutory Text, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 453, 488–89 (describing the same dynamic).
See generally RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., THE POWER OF THE PURSE: APPROPRIATIONS POLITICS IN
CONGRESS (1966) (describing the inner workings of the appropriations process). Indeed, some
internal agency policies expressly require compliance with these legislatively enforced sources of
law, notwithstanding the fact that they would not be recognized by a court. CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
R43098, TRANSFER AND REPROGRAMMING OF APPROPRIATIONS 7 & n.35 (2013); see, e.g., FUNDS
DISTRIB. & CONTROL TEAM, OFF. OF THE CHIEF FIN. OFFICER, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY BUDGET EXECUTION—FUNDS DISTRIBUTION AND CONTROL
MANUAL ch. V, at V-1 to V-2 (2006), https://www.directives.doe.gov/directives-documents/100series/0135.1-DManual-1a/@@images/file [https://perma.cc/CML3-BRUS] (“[F]or areas known to
be of interest or concern to Congress, DOE intends to notify congressional committees promptly . . .
.”); OFF. OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., BUDGET EXECUTION: PROCESSES
AND FLEXIBILITY 6 (2015), https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/execution/
Budget_Execution_Tutorial.pptx [https://perma.cc/KU9Z-DD8B] (“Movement of funds within an
account are governed by agreements between DoD and the congressional authorization and
appropriations committees.”); 3 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REGULATION ch.
6, at 6-6 (2019), https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/fmr/current/03/03_06.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6KZD-K8D5] (setting procedure for reprogramming actions that “require prior
approval of the congressional committees”).
68. SCHICK, supra note 67, at 92 (describing the president’s budget preparation process).
69. Id. at 103; see, e.g., OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, A BUDGET FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE
APPENDIX (2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/appendix_fy21.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PT9W-HT4Z].
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practicable.”70 Failure to do so could result in punishment in the next
year’s appropriation.71
Committee reports. Several reports are generally produced in the
run-up to enactment of an annual appropriations act. These include
committee reports from the House Appropriations Committee and the
Senate Appropriations Committee, as well as the joint statement of
managers on the conference report.72 When courts interpret statutes,
of course, such reports are legislative history that might serve as a
controversial tool to interpret the text, but normally do not have
independent meaning. Their effect is very different in the annual
appropriations process.
Congress routinely includes “detailed guidance on how funds are
to be spent” in committee reports and the managers’ statements, rather
than in appropriations enactments themselves.73 Congress expects
agencies to abide by the language in these reports, and agencies
routinely do so.74 Indeed, as with any body of law, the wording of these
reports has taken on highly specialized meaning that is known and
understood by agencies and Congress.75
Transfer and reprogramming pre-approval requirements.
Moreover, Congress often includes the requirement in statutory text or
report language that agencies obtain pre-approval from the relevant
appropriations subcommittee before exercising a transfer authority or
“reprogramming” funds. These requirements, of course, are not

70. SCHICK, supra note 67, at 270.
71. H.R. REP. NO. 93-662, at 16 (1973) (warning that while the DOD could depart from its
proffered justifications “[i]n a strictly legal sense,” doing so “would cause Congress to lose
confidence in the requests made and probably result in reduced appropriations”).
72. SCHICK, supra note 67, at 271.
73. Id.
74. Id. (“In most cases, . . . agencies comply with the report language.”); see also Cross, supra
note 67, at 486 (describing Congress’s “power to reward or punish agencies in the future based on
the extent to which the agencies comply”). As Professors Gluck and Bressman uncover in their
famous survey of legislative staffers, such staffers themselves see these appropriations conference
reports as “essentially . . . legislat[ive],” such that the drafting experts of the Office of Legislative
Counsel—ordinarily tabbed to write only legislation, but not legislative history—are tabbed to
write such reports as well. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation
from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part
I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 980 (2013).
75. SCHICK, supra note 67, at 271 (“In these reports, wording is crucial because it conveys
the extent to which the committee allows latitude in carrying out instructions; report language is
carefully
crafted . . . .”).
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enforceable in court even when they appear in statutory text because
the delegation of judicially enforceable power to a subcommittee of
Congress would violate the constitutional requirements of
bicameralism and presentment.76 They nonetheless bind the agencies
that follow these requirements and are punished by Congress if they
do not.77
B. Permanent Appropriations Circumscribe Congress’s Domain
Of course, any delegation of legislative power increases the
quotidian power of the executive branch and thereby shifts the balance
of power. Delegating the power over spending to the executive in a
permanent law that is not subject to annual appropriations, however,
does more than that. It not only grants the executive power, but
simultaneously takes power away from the legislature. It does so by
shrinking and diluting the congressional power to refuse funding
described in the prior subpart.
For the most part, Congress does not diminish its legislative power
when it delegates regulatory power to an agency.78 When Congress
gives an agency power to regulate a subject, Congress’s power to
regulate that subject through law is largely undiminished. Congress can
always change the law, and the process for doing so is the same one it
would be if Congress had never delegated power to the agency in the
first place. Prior to a delegation of regulatory power to an agency,
Congress can regulate through bicameralism and presentment, and
after the delegation, Congress can still do so.
The appropriations power—particularly the power to refuse
funding—is different. As discussed in Part II.A, by constitutional
default each house of Congress has a unicameral power to refuse
76. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955–59 (1983).
77. See The Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the
Department of Defense: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 116th Cong. 9 (2019)
(explaining “gentleman’s agreement” by which DOD sought advance approval from relevant
committees before reprogramming funds pursuant to its legal authority); Pasachoff, The
President’s Budget Powers, supra note 36, at 79 (“Some committees expect advance notification
when transfers or reprogramming above a certain amount are planned, while others expect that
no transfers or reprogramming will take place without advance approval, sometimes not only by
the appropriations committees but by the authorizing committees as well.”).
78. Programs can become politically entrenched, in which case legislative delegations can
reduce the power of future Congresses in a political sense. See Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I.
Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400, 463 (2015) (recognizing that a
new program may bring popular support that makes it politically difficult to undo).
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funding. But when Congress creates a permanent appropriation, it
destroys that power to refuse funding as it applies to the subject of the
appropriation. Prior to a delegation of permanent spending authority,
each house can influence spending by refusing to fund, and after the
delegation, neither house can do so.79 Permanent appropriations shrink
Congress’s domain.80
C. Permanent Appropriations Dilute Congress’s Power in Its Domain
Each chamber’s loss of control over some spending is not the only
way permanent appropriations provisions diminish congressional
power. The increasing levels of executive discretion to spend without
Congress’s approval dilutes the importance of the annual
appropriations process altogether. It increases the executive’s ability to
fend for itself when Congress tries to punish it by denying funding
pursuant to the annual appropriations process.
Professor Randy Kozel unpacks this concept of leverage.
Discretion as to a particular question or function can be expanded into
other areas by means of “overreach”—“the government might mix and
match benefits and burdens in order to affect conduct it has no business
influencing”—and by means of “aggrandizement”—“enhancing . . .
influence without operating through proper channels.”81
There are acute risks of overreach and aggrandizement in
executive discretion over funding. The potential of explicit conditions
on funding to influence behavior completely unrelated to the funding
itself is well explored in the “legislative conditions” context.82
However, executive discretion over spending means the executive can
79. See Harrison, supra note 43, at 403 (“A Congress that wanted to commit its successors as
little as possible to a program of public benefit would authorize or appropriate only for a limited
period of time.”); id. (“Unless a future Congress musters a majority to the contrary, . . . programs
[funded by a permanent, indefinite appropriation] commit the expenditure of federal funds for
all future time.”).
80. Provisions in permanent law that enhance executive power include direct permanent
appropriations, provisions in permanent law permitting agencies to transfer funds within annual
appropriations from one area to another, and provisions in permanent law that permit agencies
to generate resources in ways outside of the appropriations process, such as by creating
instrumentalities for nonappropriated funds. All of these give the executive enduring control over
spending in ways beyond each chamber’s power to refuse funds in the annual appropriations
process.
81. Randy J. Kozel, Leverage, 61 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 36, 39–41),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3566436 [https://perma.cc/UJ2J-GDHJ].
82. See generally, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending
Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861 (2013) (discussing this doctrine).
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impose conditions, too, and the executive’s conditions need not be
public or explicit. The president and agencies can leverage the promise
of funding, or the threat of denying funding, to compel behavior by
third parties or Congress elsewhere that they could not otherwise
compel. And these third parties have limited ability to challenge such
conditions without upsetting the “hand that feeds.”
In fact, two examples illustrating the dangerous potential of the
power to refuse funding have taken place in the past few years. The
first instance occurred when President Donald Trump attempted to
pressure Ukraine into investigating his political rival by impounding
appropriated military aid pending the country’s agreement to do so.83
And the second took place more recently when Trump attempted to
withhold funding for the World Health Organization (“WHO”).84
It is important to note that the public quickly learned about both
the Ukraine and the WHO examples, and they were controversial
because the executive discretion over the implicated expenditures was
subject to the annual appropriations process.85 They occurred within
Congress’s domain. Yes, Congress granted the executive some
discretion over funding for Ukraine and the WHO, but it held a purse
string to ensure it could effectively oversee the executive’s use of that
discretion.
Executive discretion over permanently appropriated funding
brings the same risks of leverage without meaningful hope of either a
legislative or a judicial check. Congress loses its direct oversight role
over permanently funded programs in the annual appropriations
process. Meanwhile, judicial review of presidential discretion over
spending is unlikely, especially where the executive declines to spend.

83. See H.R. REP. NO. 116-346, at 2 (2019) (describing the president as a “threat to national
security and the Constitution”).
84. Teo Armus, Trump Threatens To Permanently Cut WHO Funding, Leave Body If Changes
Aren’t Made Within 30 Days, WASH. POST (May 19, 2020, 8:46 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/05/19/who-funding-trump [https://perma.cc/4QR5-ZR7T].
85. Indeed, the Ukraine aid impoundment was subject to congressional alarm and
investigation even before a whistleblower complaint revealed the extortion attempt behind it. See
Letter from John Yarmuth, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Budget to The Hon. Mick Mulvaney,
Acting Chief of Staff, The White House (Sept. 18, 2019), https://budget.house.gov/sites/
democrats.budget.house.gov/files/documents/OMB%20Letter_081919_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CA4P-H6TK] (raising concerns about impoundment of Ukraine funds). The discovery ultimately
led to the president’s impeachment. See Emily Cochrane, Eric Lipton & Chris Cameron, G.A.O.
Report Says Trump Administration Broke Law in Withholding Ukraine Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17,
2020), https://nyti.ms/2FXR5e2 [https://perma.cc/2X7Z-PHT3].
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Entities who hope for funding but who are denied may not be able to
generate standing—unattainable without the ability to point to a
specific denial—unless the approvals process is tightly controlled by
law.86 And, as Professor Mila Sohoni points out in her discussion of
executive creation of new entitlements, a lawsuit to challenge the grant
of funding to others is unlikely without taxpayer standing.87
III. CHEVRON FOR APPROPRIATIONS?
The distinction between annual appropriations provisions, which
preserve congressional authority, and permanent appropriations
provisions, which diminish it, can have implications for administrative
law doctrine. The open doctrinal question of whether courts should
defer to agency interpretations of appropriations provisions—
otherwise known as Chevron for appropriations—offers an important
example. This Part explains why.
Section A offers a refresher on Chevron. Section B explains that
when interpreting appropriations provisions, courts have come to
varying conclusions about whether to apply an interpretive
presumption to appropriations provisions—often either deferring or
applying a rule of narrow interpretation—or simply to interpret them
de novo. Section C argues that courts should presumptively deny
deference for permanent appropriations provisions, but not for annual
appropriations provisions. Section D argues that courts should
consider the unique nature of annual and permanent appropriations in
evaluating whether to defer in particular cases. Section E identifies
doctrinal support for tailoring deference to the nature of annual and
permanent appropriations.
A. A Chevron Refresher
When a federal administrative agency has interpreted an
ambiguous statutory provision, courts may defer to that agency’s
86. Sherley v. Sebelius is an exception that illustrates the difficulty that those who wish for
but do not receive funding have in bringing suit. 610 F.3d 69, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2010). There, the D.C.
Circuit found that a grant applicant had standing to challenge a funding award to a competitor,
but only because the applicant had formally applied for and been denied the grant and because
the award to the competitor of the zero-sum grant pool diminished the challenger’s likelihood of
being funded. Id. at 72–74.
87. See Sohoni, supra note 19, at 1685 (addressing a lack of judicial review of executive
discretion over spending, as well as the possibility of political entrenchment when the executive
creates entitlements).
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interpretation and treat its interpretation as binding under Chevron.
Doctrinally, courts decide whether to treat an agency’s interpretation
as binding in three steps, though each has substeps and the boundaries
between them can blur. The steps are referred to as Chevron Step
Zero, Chevron Step One, and Chevron Step Two.
Step Zero explores the character of the statute at issue and the
agency interpretation of that statute to decide whether to proceed.
Some statutes and some agency interpretations are simply ineligible for
deference at this step. Step Zero doctrine “is a mess.”88 Under Mead,
courts ask whether Congress intended the agency to be able to act with
the force of law and, if so, whether the agency has utilized its force-oflaw authority in developing its interpretation.89 Courts also insist at
Step Zero that the statute the agency has interpreted be one the agency
implements.90 The Supreme Court has instructed that this will often be
true for agency interpretations developed through statutorily
authorized notice-and-comment processes, but not always.91
Courts applying the Mead test draw further guidance, beyond
these presumptions, from factors articulated by the Supreme Court in
Barnhart v. Walton92: “[T]he interstitial nature of the legal question,
the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to
administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration,
and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over
a long period of time.”93 Professors Kristin Hickman and Aaron
Nielson highlight a related but somewhat more fundamental set of
considerations that courts and scholars tend to focus on in mapping
Chevron’s domain: expertise (Would judicial resolution of ambiguities
reduce the correctness of decisions reached, especially complicated
scientific and technical questions?), political accountability (Would
agency determination entail greater opportunities for public

88. Kristin E. Hickman & Aaron L. Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, 70 DUKE L.J.
931, 977 (2021).
89. See Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era of Administrative Law: An Empirical Study of
the Supreme Court’s Retreat from Chevron Principles in United States v. Mead, 107 DICK. L. REV.
289, 309–13 (2002).
90. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. & KRISTIN E. HICKMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 3.6.2 (6th ed. 2020).
91. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
92. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
93. Id. at 222.
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participation?), and delegation (Is there some indication that Congress
intended agencies rather than that courts to resolve ambiguities?).94
If Step Zero cuts against deference, that ends the inquiry. If it cuts
in favor, courts proceed to Steps One and Two. Step One explores the
text of the statute, searching for ambiguity.95 Step One depends entirely
on ordinary questions of statutory interpretation, though the meaning
of “ambiguity” and the decision of which statutory tools to employ at
Step One are crucial and thorny questions.96 If a statute is ambiguous,
then the court proceeds to Step Two. If not, the court refuses
deference.
Step Two does two things. What can be thought of as the statutory
component of Step Two explores the text of the statute, this time
focusing on the consistencies between the agency’s interpretation and
the scope of the textual ambiguity. Depending on the way a court
frames Step One, this component merges with that inquiry. The more
substantive component of Step Two evaluates the traditional
administrative law question of whether the agency’s policy decision of
how to resolve the statutory ambiguity is itself arbitrary and
capricious.97
Why does this complicated doctrine get so much attention?
Because it is one of the most important levers that courts have to
modulate the balance of power between themselves and agencies.98
Congress has used its legislative power to entrench broad and
significant authority in the administrative state, most of which it gives
directly to agencies, part of the executive branch (some would say the
fourth branch, others the second; I do not mean to engage the unitary
executive debate). But legislation inevitably, and often intentionally,
entails ambiguities. The question of what to do about those ambiguities
is an interpretive one that, under the U.S. Constitution, falls by default
within the authority of the third branch, the courts. So, by default,

94. See Hickman & Nielson, supra note 88, at 938. Uniformity also comes up as a factor,
PIERCE & HICKMAN, supra note 90, § 3.8, but I do not evaluate it separately here on the
assumption that it is unlikely that one agency could become subject to competing orders about
the legality of its spending from a particular appropriations provision, even without Chevron.
95. PIERCE & HICKMAN, supra note 90, § 3.5.1.
96. Id.
97. See id. (discussing equivalence of Step Two and arbitrary and capricious review).
98. Cf. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 761 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (applying
Chevron “wrests from Courts the ultimate interpretive authority to ‘say what the law is’ and hands
it over to the Executive” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))).
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congressional delegations give some power to agencies (through clear
language) and some power to courts (through ambiguities).
Chevron does two distinct things to ambiguities to change the
constitutional default. First, Chevron delegates (or deems Congress to
have delegated) the power entailed in resolving ambiguities to agencies
rather than the constitutional default, courts. It thereby consolidates
the power given away by Congress through delegations in the executive
branch rather than leaving that power divided between the executive
and the judiciary.
Second, Chevron preserves ambiguities and the delegated power
they entail. In the act of interpreting an ambiguity, an appellate court
solidifies it. Stare decisis both denies future courts the option of
changing the interpretation, with rare exceptions, and grants those
regulated by the law predictability about the meaning of the previously
uncertain provision.99 This anti-entrenchment function of Chevron is
not subsidiary to its delegation function. It is independent. An agency
cannot choose to solidify the meaning of an ambiguous provision of law
even if it wants to. Inevitably, a subsequent agency head, or president,
might choose to change it.
B. Courts’ Varied Approaches to Chevron for Appropriations
Judicial decisions regarding the applicability of Chevron to
appropriations are relatively rare. Courts’ approaches in these
relatively few reported instances have run the gamut. Some courts have
applied a clear statement rule against funding rather than Chevron,
others have applied a categorical bar that treats appropriations as
exceptional and ineligible for deference, and still others have applied
the tests from Mead and Barnhart to preclude and to find deference—
sometimes based on the process used by an agency to reach its
interpretation. Other courts have given Chevron deference to
appropriations provisions without questioning whether appropriations
might be different.
1. Rule of Narrow Interpretation in ACA Case. The district court
for the District of Columbia applied a clear statement rule requiring
that appropriations be interpreted narrowly in United States House of
99. See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1304–05 (2007) (describing tension between deference under
Chevron and Skidmore and stare decisis).
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Representatives v. Burwell100 (against funding). In this case, the House
of Representatives challenged the expenditure of funds from the
permanent, indefinite refundable tax credit appropriation. The
expenditure was used for an ACA subsidy that the House alleged
required an annual appropriation.101 The district court read the
“purpose statute,” 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d), to mandate such a clear
statement rule.102 This approach foreclosed any possibility of Chevron
deference.103
I have explained elsewhere the misunderstanding of § 1301(d) on
which this clear statement rule approach rests.104 That provision creates
a clear statement rule for the question of whether an enactment creates
an appropriation; however, it does not address the scope of an
appropriation once created.105
In California v. Trump,106 the district court for the Northern
District of California addressed the same question that had been
presented in House v. Burwell about the meaning of the refundable tax
credit appropriation.107 (By that time, the Trump administration had
halted the payment on the ground that it lacked an appropriation, so
the suit was brought by states arguing the Trump administration had
gotten that judgment wrong.108 Thus, the position of the agency was
reversed but the legal question was identical.) It refused to find a clear
statement rule based in § 1301(d) for the reason just explained—the
provision governs the question of whether an enactment appropriates
funds, not the subsidiary question of the scope of the appropriation

100. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2016), vacated in
part sub nom. U.S. House of Representatives v. Azar, No. 14-CV-01967, 2018 WL 8576647
(D.D.C. May 18, 2018).
101. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 168, 170, 188.
102. See id. at 174 (“[A]n appropriation cannot be inferred . . . . ‘A law may be construed to
make an appropriation . . . only if the law specifically states that an appropriation is made.’”
(quoting 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d) (2018))).
103. See id. at 188 (rejecting any ambiguity in the statute’s terms and relying in part on
§ 1301(d) to preclude the agency’s proposed interpretation).
104. Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 8, at 76.
105. Id.
106. California v. Trump, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
107. See id. at 1124–26.
108. Id. at 1126.
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thus made.109 Nonetheless, the California v. Trump court hinted at a
rule of narrow interpretation based in the separation of powers.110
2. Chevron for Appropriations in Stem Cell and Other Cases. The
fullest discussion in a case finding Chevron Step Zero satisfied and
deference applicable is in Norton Construction Co. v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers.111 There, the court granted Chevron
deference to an agency’s interpretation of an appropriations rider’s
funding restriction that prohibited the use of funds in an annual
appropriation for a permit application.112 The court held that
“[b]ecause this was an appropriations bill related to matters already
delegated to the Corps, it is reasonable to assume that to the extent the
Congress was not clear it implicitly delegated interpretation of section
103 to the Corps.”113 That said, the court declined to address the
question of whether the appropriations riders counted as the Corps’s
“governing statute” because neither party had raised it.114
Several other cases have explicitly deferred to agencies’
interpretations of annual appropriations provisions. These include
district court decisions addressing agencies’ interpretations of an
appropriation’s affirmative purpose statement115 and funding
109. Id. at 1132 (“[T]he clear-statement rule announced in [§ 1301(d)] is of limited relevance
here, since . . . the disagreement concerns the scope of that appropriation, not its existence.”).
110. The court recognized the constitutional implications in the appropriations context:
Looming over this whole discussion is the fact that the parties are disputing the
meaning of an appropriations statute, not just any statute . . . . [T]he role of the
Appropriations Clause in enforcing the constitutional separation of powers provides
reason for caution in adopting a reading of an appropriations statute broader than the
one most obviously provided by the text.
Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of the Navy v. FLRA, 665 F.3d 1339, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
111. Norton Constr. Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 03-CV-2257, 2007 WL 1431907
(N.D. Ohio May 14, 2007).
112. Id. at *1, *5.
113. Id. at *4.
114. Norton Constr. Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 03-CV-2257, 2005 WL 8168489,
at *5 n.4 (N.D. Ohio May 10, 2005), vacated, No. 03-CV-2257, 2005 WL 8168489 (N.D. Ohio June
22, 2006) (“The Court is not entirely convinced that the appropriations riders herein constitute
the Corps’ ‘governing statute,’ to which Chevron principles would apply. However, as neither
party raises the issue, the Court has not addressed it herein.”).
115. Healthy Teen Network v. Azar, 322 F. Supp. 3d 647, 659 n.16 (D. Md. 2018) (recognizing
that “HHS may well receive [Chevron] deference on its own interpretation of the relevant factors”
of the affirmative purpose statement of the annual appropriations act); see also Gay Men’s Health
Crisis v. Sullivan, 733 F. Supp. 619, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“[T]his Court must defer to an agency’s
reasonable construction of its own enabling legislation and of the appropriations bills that fund
it.”).
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restrictions.116 Perhaps the most famous case in this category is the D.C.
Circuit’s decision in Sherley v. Sebelius117 regarding the applicability of
the Dickey-Wicker Amendment—a funding restriction—to embryonic
stem cell research.118 The funding restriction had been included in the
National Institutes of Health’s annual appropriations provisions each
year since 1996.119 The agency was able to, and did, go through noticeand-comment rulemaking in developing its interpretation that the
amendment did not bar funding for certain stem cell research.120 The
D.C. Circuit cited that fact, treated the case as a relatively
straightforward Chevron case, and ultimately deferred to the agency’s
interpretation.
3. Categorical Ineligibility for Deference in Western Watersheds
Reflects Stray Language Taking Root. One district court decision held
that agency interpretations of annual appropriations are categorically
ineligible for deference at Chevron Step Zero because agencies do not
administer “budget bills.”121 In Western Watersheds Project v. United
States Forest Service,122 the District of Idaho refused to defer to the
Forest Service’s interpretation of a funding restriction in the
Department of Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 2012.123
Western Watersheds may be a budding example of a regrettable
phenomenon familiar in the law: a case is taken to have held something
it did not hold based on an out-of-context quote, but the holding
116. Moore v. Navy Pub. Works Ctr., 139 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1357–58 (N.D. Fla. 2001)
(deferring to the Navy’s interpretation of a funding restriction in the DOD Appropriations Act).
117. Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
118. Id. at 389–90.
119. Id. at 390.
120. Id. at 391.
121. W. Watersheds Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 12-cv-00286, 2012 WL 2254206, at *1 (D.
Idaho June 15, 2012).
122. W. Watersheds Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 12-cv-00286, 2012 WL 2254206 (D. Idaho
June 15, 2012).
123. The District Court reasoned that:
Chevron deference does not apply to cases where an agency interprets a statute that it
does not administer and therefore falls outside its scope of expertise. The Forest
Service Administers its organic statute, NFMA, not budget bills . . . . Reconciling the
appropriations rider with NFMA’s substantive obligations is therefore a purely legal
question warranting a less deferential standard.
Id. at *1 (citation omitted) (referring to the “appropriations rider” in the Department of the
Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, div.
E, tit. IV, § 431, 125 Stat. 985, 1047).
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becomes real when a subsequent case relies on its misinterpretation of
the quote to make new law. In the Western Watersheds case, the only
case to date to hold appropriations categorically ineligible for
deference, the only precedent that the district court cited in coming to
that holding was a Ninth Circuit Federal Labor Relations Authority
(“FLRA”) case.124 Similarly, in an insightful analysis of King v. Burwell
that elsewhere recognizes the question is not settled, Sohoni cites a
D.C. Circuit case, United States Department of the Navy v. FLRA,125 as
having held that “interpretations of appropriations statutes by agencies
. . . are not entitled to deference.”126
The Ninth and D.C. Circuits’ FLRA cases do not support the
conclusion for which they are cited—that agencies do not receive
deference for their interpretations of appropriations. They instead deal
with a different, far simpler issue. The FLRA oversees labor relations
within the federal government, and thus frequently engages with and
is tasked with interpreting legislation that applies to other agencies.127
Not surprisingly then, in several somewhat recent cases to reach the
circuit courts, the issue in dispute has been the FLRA’s interpretation
of a provision in an appropriations statute applicable to another
agency.128
Of course, the FLRA should not receive deference when it
interprets a statutory provision that applies to another agency—
whether that provision is in an appropriation or not—because such a
provision is not one that Congress has “entrusted the [FLRA] to
administer.”129 That is what these FLRA cases have held. However, the
language the circuits have used can be read out of context to comment
on the applicability of Chevron to appropriations generally. For
example, in one case the D.C. Circuit said that “the court owes no
124. Id. (citing Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, Silver Barons Chapter v. FLRA, 200 F.3d 590,
592 (9th Cir. 2000)).
125. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy v. FLRA, 665 F.3d 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
126. Mila Sohoni, King’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1428 (2018).
127. E.g., NLRB v. FLRA, 613 F.3d 275, 277–78 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (addressing dispute between
FLRA and NLRB about how to shape bargaining units at NLRB that turned on the meaning of
separation of functions provisions governing the NLRB general counsel in the National Labor
Relations Act).
128. See Dep’t of the Navy, 665 F.3d at 1348; Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, P.R. Army Chapter
v. FLRA, 370 F.3d 1214, 1221–22 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, Tony
Kempenich Mem’l Chapter 21 v. FLRA, 269 F.3d 1119, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Silver Barons
Chapter, 200 F.3d at 592.
129. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
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deference to FLRA’s interpretation of the appropriations act.”130
Reading this line alone, a reader might take the court to have refused
deference based on the nature of the enactment rather than the agency
doing the interpreting. In another case, the D.C. Circuit held that
another agency’s appropriation statute was “not within [FLRA’s] area
of expertise.”131 In a similar vein, the Ninth Circuit noted that “courts
do not owe deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is not
charged with administering” and went on to refuse deference to the
FLRA’s interpretation of a DOD Appropriations Act because “the
FLRA is not charged with administering the DOD Appropriations
Act.”132 Although the question of Chevron’s applicability to
appropriations is interesting and important, these FLRA cases do not
offer an answer.
4. Application of Barnhart Factors To Reject Deference in Wall
Case. Most recently, the Ninth Circuit refused to apply Chevron
deference to the Trump administration’s interpretation of an annual
transfer authority. In early 2019, the federal government went through
the longest partial shutdown in its history in a standoff between
Democrats, who had received majority support in the 2018 midterms
and thus controlled the House of Representatives, and Trump, who
had received a majority of the electoral votes in 2016.133 The standoff
was about whether Congress would provide the funds the president
wanted to build a wall along the southern border.134

130. P.R. Army Chapter, 370 F.3d at 1221 (citing Kempenich Memorial Chapter, 269 F.3d at
1121). Kempenich explained that the court would owe deference to FLRA’s interpretation of the
Federal Service Labor Management Relations Act, but not to “FLRA’s interpretation of a statute
not committed to the Authority’s administration,” such as the DOD Appropriations Act. 269 F.3d
at 1121.
131. Dep’t of the Navy, 665 F.3d at 1348 (repeating that the FLRA receives deference when
interpreting its “organic statute” but it “receives no deference, however, when it ‘has
endeavored to reconcile its organic statute with another statute’—such as a federal
appropriations statute—‘not within its area of expertise’” (quoting U.S. Dep’t of the Air
Force v. FLRA, 648 F.3d 841, 846 (D.C. Cir. 2011))).
132. Silver Barons Chapter, 200 F.3d at 592.
133. Kristina Peterson, Michael C. Bender & Rebecca Ballhaus, Shutdown Breaks Record for
Longest in Modern History, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
trump-plays-down-emergency-option-to-get-wall-funding-11547238564 [perma.cc/MF4B-JZGM].
134. See Aaron Blake, Trump’s Extraordinary Oval Office Squabble with Chuck Schumer and
Nancy Pelosi, Annotated, WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2018, 1:02 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/2018/12/11/trumps-extraordinary-oval-office-squabble-with-chuck-schumer-nancy-pelosiannotated [https://perma.cc/5D32-YRZ6] (“TRUMP: . . . If we don’t get what we want one way or
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The standoff ended with a victory of sorts for Democrats, who
appropriated $1.375 billion for fencing along the Rio Grande,135 not the
$5 billion the president had requested for a “down payment” on a
longer wall.136 However, on the same day that he signed the
appropriations into law, Trump announced that he would nonetheless
pay for a longer wall using funds cobbled together through various
appropriations authorities. Specifically, the White House issued a
“victory” fact sheet explaining the complex web of appropriations
provisions it would utilize to generate roughly $6.8 billion in funding
for wall construction.137
The money would primarily come through two complicated and
legally controversial appropriations two-steps that used a combination
of annual transfer authorities and permanent conditional funding
authorities to tap into and redirect previously appropriated annual
funds. Section 8005 of the DOD Appropriations Act of 2019 would be
used to transfer $2.5 billion in existing appropriations—which had been
enacted in September 2018—into a DOD counterdrug activities
account.138 The available purposes for that account would then,
through operation of the permanent conditional funding authority for
counternarcotics operations in 10 U.S.C. § 284, be expanded to include
wall construction.139 In a separate but similarly complicated two-step,
the president would declare a national emergency, which would
allegedly make it possible for the secretary of defense to utilize another
permanent conditional funding authority, 10 U.S.C. § 2808, to put
another $3.6 billion in previously appropriated annual funds toward

the other, whether it’s through you, through a military, through anything you want to call, I will shut
down the government, absolutely . . . . I’m going to shut it down for border security.”).
135. See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6, div.
A, tit. II, § 230(a)(1), 133 Stat. 15, 28.
136. Ben Zimmer, Trump’s ‘Down Payment’ Trick, ATLANTIC (Jan. 25, 2019), https://
www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2019/01/the-history-behind-trumps-down-paymenttrick/581275 [https://perma.cc/FL2X-KAFR].
137. See President Donald J. Trump’s Border Security Victory, W HITE H OUSE (Feb. 15,
2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-bordersecurity-victory [https://perma.cc/B6LC-9ZGB] [hereafter Victory Fact Sheet].
138. See id. For the operation of § 8005 transfers, see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
139. See Victory Fact Sheet, supra note 137 (referencing 10 U.S.C. § 284 (2018), which permits
support to be provided for “[c]onstruction of roads and fences and installation of lighting to block
drug smuggling corridors across international boundaries of the United States”).
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wall construction.140 The remaining $700 million would come directly
from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund.141
In Ninth Circuit litigation regarding the $2.5 billion in funding
tapped through the § 8005 transfer, the Court squarely addressed
whether to give Chevron deference to the agency’s interpretation of
that annual transfer authority.142 Section 8005 permits the secretary of
defense to transfer up to $4 billion in DOD working capital funds
appropriated in the 2019 appropriations act “for military functions
(except military construction) . . . Provided, That such authority to
transfer may not be used . . . where the item for which funds are
requested has been denied by the Congress.”143 Plaintiffs challenging
the transfer argued that wall construction was “military construction”
and so ineligible for transfer.144 They also argued that Congress had
affirmatively denied funds for wall construction by refusing to grant
them when the president asked.145 The DOD disagreed on both
counts.146
Although the government did not raise the issue of Chevron
deference,147 the Ninth Circuit addressed it anyway in upholding a
preliminary injunction, which was ultimately stayed by the Supreme
Court. It conducted a Step Zero analysis by applying the Barnhart
factors one by one, finding they weighed against deference.148
Specifically, it concluded that the agency’s interpretation of § 8005 was
not entitled to deference at Chevron Step Zero because the DOD’s
authorizing and appropriations statutes did not contain an “explicit
grant of rulemaking power” as the agency lacked expertise to
determine whether funds had been “denied by the Congress.”149 This
happened due to the agency not engaging in notice-and-comment
rulemaking when coming to its interpretation, and because the
140. See Victory Fact Sheet, supra note 137.
141. Id. The fund is governed by 31 U.S.C. § 9705(a) (2018).
142. Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 692–93 (9th Cir. 2019).
143. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245, div. A, tit. VIII,
§ 8005, 132 Stat. 2982, 2999.
144. Sierra Club, 929 F.3d at 683.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 683, 690.
147. Id. (“Defendants did not argue in their briefing to the district court, their stay motion, or
their supplemental briefing that their contrary interpretation of section 8005 is entitled to agency
deference.”).
148. Id. at 692–93.
149. Id.
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agency’s interpretation had apparently been decided upon “in a matter
of weeks.”150
C. A Bifurcated Approach
What approach to Chevron for appropriations should future
courts employ and, ultimately, should the judiciary settle on? Courts’
default may be to follow the Ninth Circuit by simply applying a literal
version of the Barnhart factors to any appropriations interpretation
they confront as if it were an interpretation of ordinary legislation,
without tailoring deference to the appropriations context.151
Literal application of the Barnhart factors will tend to favor
deference for permanent appropriations provisions and appropriations
riders that are regularly included in legislation with identical language.
The “long period of time” factor favors permanent appropriations for
obvious reasons. The ephemeral nature of annual appropriations
makes notice-and-comment rulemaking difficult except in the case of
language reenacted year after year, so the question of whether the
agency went through notice and comment similarly favors permanent
appropriations.152 (Whether and how the “interstitial nature of the
legal question” and “expertise of the agency” will come into play does
not obviously depend on the duration of the appropriation provision at
issue.)
The “tools” by which a tightening Chevron Step Zero limits
deference—in particular, by demanding notice and comment153—are a
poor fit for the distinctive considerations presented by appropriations.
In light of the differing impacts of annual and permanent
appropriations provisions on the separation of powers described in
Part II, the results dictated by literal application of the Barnhart factors
would be upside-down if courts’ goal is to avoid interference with the
separation of powers. Deference for permanent appropriations
diminishes legislative power, and deference for annual appropriations
is consistent with Congress’s expectation of a back-and-forth with
agencies in which they will comply not only with appropriations
provisions but also with various unicameral “legal” requirements.

150. Id.
151. See supra Part III.B.4.
152. See, e.g., Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 395–96 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (deferring under
Chevron to an agency interpretation of an annual appropriations provision reenacted in multiple
years, that had been subject to notice and comment).
153. Hickman & Nielson, supra note 88, at 995–96.
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Courts should take a bifurcated approach to Chevron for
appropriations instead of an untailored, literal application of tests from
Mead or Barnhart. As elaborated upon below, permanent
appropriations provisions should be presumptively ineligible for
deference, but not annual appropriations provisions.
1. Assumptions.
The prescriptions below rest on several
normative assumptions about how courts “should” decide questions
about deference, though the analysis endeavors to identify points of
departure for those who do not share these assumptions. These include
assumptions common to Chevron analysis about the role of intent,
expertise, political accountability, and history. One is that of presumed
intent, that courts should look for particularized indicia that Congress
itself would (or would not) want or expect deference.154 Two more are
that Chevron’s applicability should be considered in light of whether
deference would tend to promote expertise and political
accountability.155 Another—drawn from the idea of presumed intent as
well as rule-of-law values—is that courts’ historical application (or
refusal) of deference for types of cases should inform decisions about
related cases’ eligibility for deference in the future.156
The driving assumption here is newer to Chevron analysis. It is
that courts, in resolving open interpretive questions, should endeavor
not to diminish legislative power in the appropriations process. In other
words, the separation of powers analysis in Part II should influence
courts’ decisions about deference, and they should disfavor approaches
that interfere unnecessarily with Congress’s domain—at least where
considerations of expertise, accountability, presumed intent, and
precedent do not favor deference.

154. Chevron is based in part on a presumption about congressional intent, that Congress
intended certain ambiguities to be resolved by agencies rather than courts. Thomas W. Merrill &
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 872 (2001).
155. Supra note 94 and accompanying text.
156. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 301–05 (2013) (looking to past judicial precedent
in analogous cases in considering availability of deference).
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This assumption may be controversial among legal scholars,157 but
it is defensible,158 and courts have employed it.159 Chevron calibrates

157. Scholars have occasionally argued that it is better for Congress to engage in policymaking
through ordinary legislation, which is controlled in part by authorizing committees, than through
appropriations legislation, which is controlled by appropriations committees. See Jack M.
Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 88–90 (2006) (discussing
critiques of appropriations riders and earmarks); Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy
Riders: The Case for a Truth-in-Legislation Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957, 969–71
(expressing concern about collective action problems inherent in the appropriations process);
Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637, 2668 (2003) (describing agencyand program-specific appropriations riders abrogating Chevron and stating that “[u]sing the
appropriations process is not the best way to make [interpretive] decision[s]”); Devins, supra note
30, at 464 (“Appropriations-based policymaking may be useful, but there are strong reasons to
caution against it.”); id. at 464–65 (listing reasons weighing against appropriations-based
policymaking, including the fact that appropriations bypass authorizing committees and their
staffs); Chuzi, supra note 26, at 1005–06 (describing benefits of including authorizing committees
in the legislative process).
158. See Metzger, supra note 13 (manuscript at 6, 32–39) (arguing that administrative law
doctrine should not disfavor governing through appropriations). Professor Price’s defense of
congressional power in annual appropriations is well stated:
[I]n a world of broad delegations and expansive executive authority, Congress’s power
of the purse is the single feature of our system that most effectively guarantees an
ongoing political constraint on the president’s authority to set policy unilaterally. One
might say that if it did not exist we would have had to invent it.
Price, supra note 22, at 369; cf. Jonathan H. Adler & Christopher J. Walker, Delegation and Time,
105 IOWA L. REV. 1931, 1940–46, 1974–93 (2020) (a sustained defense of giving Congress
evergreen influence over agency behavior to overcome democratic accountability problems with
permanent delegations). Arguments in favor of respecting rather than marginalizing
appropriations are particularly strong when it comes to calibrating Chevron deference. Even
critics of the use of the appropriations process to influence policy have made such arguments from
the perspective of Congress, framing the choice as one Congress must make between influencing
policy through permanent law and influencing policy through annual appropriations. They have
not advocated for a role for courts in discouraging some forms of congressional influence or
encouraging others. Such a role would be inconsistent with the view that courts should not seek
to interfere with the balance of powers or Congress’s use of its appropriations power. See In re
Austrian & German Holocaust Litig., 250 F.3d 156, 163–64 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The doctrine of
separation of powers prohibits the federal courts from excursions into areas committed to the
Executive Branch or the Legislative Branch.”); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979)
(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting
the allocation of power between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a
constitutional impasse.”); Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Legislative Exhaustion, 58 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1253, 1257 n.3 (2017) (collecting sources supporting the idea that the political branches
should “resolv[e] their differences through nonjudicial means”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra
note 10, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword
or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no
active resolution whatever.”). Moreover, there is no reason to assume that courts, by discouraging
legislative influence through the appropriations process, simultaneously encourage Congress to
act through permanent legislation; they may simply discourage congressional influence
altogether.
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the balance of power between the second and third branches—agencies
and courts; it is a tool by which courts can give to agencies the power
that Congress otherwise delegates to courts when it writes ambiguous
statutes. Appropriations calibrate the balance of power between the
first and second branches—Congress and agencies; they are a tool
Congress reserves even as it gives away some of its power in
entrenched legislation to agencies (and perhaps courts), thereby
preserving some enduring influence for itself. Courts avoid
interference with the political branches by taking account of this
interaction in evaluating deference.
One additional normative assumption in the discussion that
follows is that courts’ approach to interpreting appropriations should
also seek to avoid systematically favoring or disfavoring social
ordering, such as federal spending. This assumption also may be
controversial, though it is defensible.160
2. Against Deference for Permanent Appropriations. When it
comes to permanent appropriations provisions, Chevron is a big deal.
In this context, Chevron’s delegation function diminishes legislative
power by expanding a potent form of presidential power. Moreover,
when applied to permanent appropriations, Chevron’s antientrenchment function frustrates congressional budgeting, and
undermines spending programs. It also conflicts with Congress’s
presumed intent, when it chooses to fund a spending program through
a permanent appropriation, to engender reliance on that program.
Courts should therefore disfavor deference for permanent
appropriations.

159. Recent judicial decisions in which courts have found it appropriate to treat
appropriations as exceptional for interpretation purposes have pointed to appropriations’
separation of powers implications as the reason. See California v. Trump, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1119,
1132 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“[T]he role of the Appropriations Clause in enforcing the constitutional
separation of powers provides reason for caution . . . .”); U.S. House of Representatives v.
Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 169–70 (D.D.C. 2016) (“[A]ppropriations are an integral part of our
constitutional checks and balances, insofar as they tie the Executive Branch to the Legislative
Branch via purse strings.”).
160. See generally Matthew B. Lawrence, The Real Imbalance in the Balance of Powers (Jan.
14, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing and
defending the principle that structural features intended to generate power for political branches
should not themselves take a side on whether resources are allocated through market or social
ordering); cf. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overturning Lochner v. United
States, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and rejecting constitutional challenge to state minimum wage law
premised on contract freedom).
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a. Delegation Function.
Applying Chevron to permanent
appropriations provisions converts any ambiguity in such a provision
into executive discretion regarding the availability of funding. It thus
tends to diminish each chamber’s power in the annual appropriations
process. When Congress intentionally reduces its purse power by
enacting a permanent appropriation that gives agencies discretion as
described in Parts II.B and C, Chevron deepens the self-inflicted
wound. If Congress does not intend to give the executive discretion
over funding in permanent law but inadvertently creates an ambiguity
in a permanent appropriation, Chevron makes Congress’s
inadvertence costly for Congress and a windfall for the executive.
This effect of Chevron on the balance of powers is direct when a
dispute about the meaning of a permanent appropriation reaches the
courts, but its impact may be even greater ex ante. The conclusion that
Chevron applies may influence internal executive behavior vis-à-vis
permanent appropriations provisions, even where the risk of actual
judicial intervention is low. In appropriations, as elsewhere in
administrative law, the first line of defense for the rule of law is
internal—civil servants, especially agency lawyers, and appointees who
take seriously their oaths to uphold the Constitution and avoid
unlawful actions, whether or not they might be caught or punished.161
In appropriations, this check is strengthened by the Antideficiency
Act, which makes “willfully” spending without an appropriation a
criminal offense.162
Treating ambiguous permanent appropriations as having one
meaning governed by statutory tools empowers this internal check; it
makes the meaning of such appropriations a legal question that must
be overseen by lawyers whose ethical duties and professional training
discourage them from blessing unreasonable interpretations or
unlawful actions. And it makes it harder for an agency to change its
view of the meaning of a permanent appropriation, once adopted.
Treating ambiguous permanent appropriations as policy questions
delegated to agencies to decide (applying Chevron) does the opposite.

161. See Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
515, 540–47 (2015) (discussing the incentives driving civil servants to follow the law for its own
sake). But cf. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2334–35 (2006) (“[Do] civil servants today
view themselves as ‘servants of the country and not of a party’? Or that their ‘success does not lie
wholly in their ability to retain the favor of political leaders’? . . . [F]ew agencies could say
[so] . . . .”).
162. 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341, 1350 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-163).
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Chevron tends to empower agency officials who lack legal training,
leaving them no reason to include lawyers in decisionmaking processes
where an ambiguity is present.
b. Entrenchment Function. Applying Chevron to permanent
appropriations also means that their meaning can change from
administration to administration, or even year to year. This antientrenchment effect also undermines congressional power in the
annual appropriations process by impeding congressional budgeting,
as well as Congress’s presumed intent.
Congress works hard to measure and predict federal expenditures
under “current law”—the laws currently on the books—both in order
to understand the nation’s direction and as a point of comparison to
assess the effects of proposed legislation. Creating and tracking this
“current law baseline”—and then measuring proposed legislation’s
effects against it—is a primary purpose of the Congressional Budget
Office and the budget committees.163 In turn, setting tax and spending
levels to reflect congressional priorities for the future progress of the
country, while establishing a framework for legislation to fit within
those priorities, is another primary task of the budget committees.164
Allowing the meaning of permanent appropriations to change,
whether through judicial or executive interpretation, makes both jobs
harder by making the government’s future expenditures under
“current law” depend on choices that will be made in the future.
King was nearly an example of this challenge. In that case, the
Supreme Court applied the “major questions” doctrine exception165 to
refuse to defer to the executive branch’s interpretation of an
ambiguous tax credit provision in the ACA, which was incorporated by

163. See David Kamin, Basing Budget Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 175–77 (2015)
(discussing the current law baseline as “show[ing] what would happen if no further legislation
were enacted”); Howell E. Jackson, Counting the Ways: The Structure of Federal Spending 10
(Mar. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=985201 [https://perma.cc/JZ77-CQNC] (describing the budget process as built around the
“baseline,” which uses “future projections” that “convey the consequences of current fiscal
commitments as extrapolated into the future” and “set a benchmark against which policy changes
can be scored”).
164. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88
Stat. 297.
165. See generally Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 VAND.
L. REV. 777 (2017) (describing the major questions exception formulated in King v. Burwell and
its proliferation in the lower courts).

LAWRENCE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1096

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

1/19/2021 5:09 PM

[Vol. 70:1057

reference in the permanent indefinite tax credit appropriation.166 But
had the court deferred, it would have created a significant source of
unpredictability in future federal expenditures, as it would have
empowered the executive branch essentially to turn “on” or “off” the
ACA’s most expensive subsidy—the premium tax credits that cost
roughly $53 billion annually.
Whatever logic underlies the Chevron assumption that Congress
intended to empower agencies through ambiguities, it is another,
unjustified leap to assume that Congress intended to disempower itself
while frustrating its own budgeting processes. Yet deferring to agency
interpretations of ambiguities in permanent appropriations provisions
does just that.
Moreover, Chevron’s anti-entrenchment function makes it harder
for Congress to create federal spending commitments in permanent
law on which people can rely. One strong reason for Congress to create
permanent appropriations, despite its separation of powers costs, is to
engender reliance on the part of funding recipients. “New property”
entitlements are emblematic of this. To the extent a permanent
appropriation is ambiguous, such reliance is still possible if there is a
mechanism to entrench a given interpretation, like stare decisis. But if
Chevron applies then ambiguity destroys reliance, because while an
agency head can adopt whatever interpretation she thinks best, she
cannot commit her successor to follow that interpretation.
King provides another example. Had the Supreme Court deferred
to the Obama administration’s interpretation of the ambiguous tax
credit provision, it would have created a shaky state of affairs for
residents considering relying on the ACA’s insurance marketplaces or
insurers considering entering them. Yes, it is doubtful that the Obama
administration would have changed its interpretation to make the
credits unavailable, but it seems altogether possible that the Trump
administration would have done so. And the mere fear of that result
would make reliance difficult, defeating the purpose of encoding the
tax credit in permanent law.
Congress has a choice when creating a spending program. It can
fund the program annually, maintaining tight control over the program
through the annual appropriations process but leaving the program
susceptible to abandonment, restriction, or sabotage as the political
winds shift. Or it can fund the program permanently, insulating it from
166. For more on King v. Burwell, see infra Part III.D (discussing the “major questions”
exception as a doctrinal path forward).
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the political process and engendering reliance. When Congress chooses
to fund a program permanently, it is reasonable to assume that
Congress intends to create a stable program. Chevron for ambiguous
permanent appropriations frustrates this presumed intent, by leaving
the program’s funding, to the extent of the ambiguity, up to the
changing views of the executive branch. Refusing Chevron for
ambiguous permanent appropriations, on the other hand, fulfills this
presumed intent, because through stare decisis courts applying de novo
review entrench the meaning of ambiguous provisions.
c. Sticky Deference Where Courts Do Defer. The fact that courts
should disfavor deference for permanent appropriations provisions
does not necessarily mean that courts should adopt a categorical bar
against such deference. It is possible that in particular cases Congress
will clearly signal its intent that it expects resolution of ambiguities in
a permanent appropriation to be resolved by the agency.
In such cases, if courts do grant deference to agency
interpretations of ambiguous permanent appropriations, they should
seek to mitigate the problematic consequences of Chevron’s antientrenchment function for reliance interests in the programs whose
funding is at stake in the ambiguity.167 Courts could do so by adopting
a version of Professor Kurt Eggert’s proposal for “sticky deference” in
Chevron cases involving reliance interests, deferring to an agency’s
interpretation of a statutory ambiguity but not permitting the agency
to change an interpretation once announced.168
Courts could, under current law, employ a version of “sticky
deference” through Chevron Step Two. Recall that Step Two includes
a substantive component in which a court will not defer to an agency’s
interpretation if it is arbitrary and capricious.169 In the Supreme Court’s
recent Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) decision, it
held that the agency’s decision to rescind DACA—to change its mind
about the program—was arbitrary and capricious because the agency
did not sufficiently consider the reliance interests participants had
formed around its prior interpretation.170
167. See supra Part III.C.3.
168. Kurt Eggert, Deference and Fiction: Reforming Chevron’s Legal Fictions After King v.
Burwell, 95 NEB. L. REV. 702, 750–51 (2017).
169. See supra Part III.A (describing Chevron deference).
170. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020)
(“When an agency changes course, . . . it must ‘be cognizant that longstanding policies may have
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Following this approach, courts might hold at Chevron Step Two
that an agency’s changed interpretation of an ambiguous appropriation
is arbitrary and capricious unless the agency meaningfully justifies that
interpretive change, despite any reliance interests generated around its
prior interpretation of that ambiguity. In this way, courts could apply a
form of “sticky deference,” partially decouple Chevron’s delegation
and anti-entrenchment functions, and mitigate one of the ways
Chevron for permanent appropriations interferes with congressional
power and practice.
d. Employing a Rule of Narrow Interpretation is Overkill. One
additional note about a path not endorsed here. Some courts have
avoided considering questions of deference by applying a clear
statement rule against the availability of appropriations.171 This
approach is problematic. Yes, insisting that appropriations be
interpreted narrowly would avoid the separation of powers concerns
posed by deference to such appropriations. But it would throw the
baby out with the bathwater, creating substantive problems,172

‘engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.’” (quoting Encino
Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016))).
171. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp.
3d 165 (D.D.C. 2016), and California v. Trump, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2017)).
172. Such a rule would, in a stroke of the judicial pen, shrink permanent appropriations of all
stripes in current law, upsetting hard-won legislative victories in which ambiguity might have
reflected compromise. Simultaneously, if applied in the annual appropriations context, it would
expand the reach of controversial funding restrictions like the Hyde Amendment and the DickeyWicker Amendment to their maximum—for these restrictions also limit the availability of
appropriations.
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undermining accountability,173 and breaking with history.174 The
presumption against deference for permanent appropriations endorsed
here mitigates disruptions to the separation of powers without these
collateral consequences.
3. For Deference for Annual Appropriations. Whether courts
defer to agency interpretations of annual appropriations provisions
does not matter very much for congressional power and practice.
Chevron operates at the margins of annual appropriations, or in their
ambiguities, and Congress can and does enforce those margins on its
own, usually without courts.175
Moreover, opportunities for judicial intervention in annual
appropriations are necessarily rare because lawsuits usually take
longer to resolve through district court litigation—notwithstanding any
possible appeals—than annual appropriations last. This mismatch
between the speed of annual appropriations and the speed of litigation
is exacerbated by two further impediments to judicial intervention.
First, the possibility that the Appropriations Clause precludes courts
from ordering emergency relief requiring expenditure when an agency
believes an appropriation is insufficient makes quick relief unlikely for
failure-to-pay claims.176 Second, the fact that taxpayers lack standing to
173. A clear statement rule against funding would undermine political accountability by
making spending legislation harder to enact in the future. Ambiguity in legislation is often an
intentional compromise; sides unable to agree on an outcome might be able to agree to roll the
dice on that outcome by leaving it to the interpretive process. Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C.
Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory
Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 628 (2002) (“Ambiguity serves a legislative
purpose. When legislators perceive a need to compromise they can, among other strategies,
‘obscur[e] the particular meaning of a statute, allowing different legislators to read the obscured
provisions the way they wish.’” (alteration in original) (quoting ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE,
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 779–80 (1995))); see also Courtney Simmons, Unmasking the Rhetoric of
Purpose: The Supreme Court and Legislative Compromise, 44 EMORY L.J. 117, 118 (1995)
(“[B]oth factions [may] accept the vague terminology because the language can be interpreted to
include their positions . . . .”). A clear statement rule would preclude this form of compromise in
legislation permitting federal spending, tending to make such legislation harder to pass.
174. See Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 8, at 75–77 (describing agency practice that
does not acknowledge a clear statement rule); supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text
(explaining that a district court’s adoption of such a clear statement rule was based on a
misunderstanding of a relevant statutory provision).
175. See supra Part II.A.
176. See Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 8, at 84–85 (raising this possibility). The
above discussion refers to the “margins” of appropriations—it does not speak to the question of
courts’ role in enforcing outright defiance of the Appropriations Clause, which raises important
questions not considered here. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 976 F.3d 1, 10
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challenge unlawful expenditures means that unlawful expenditure
claims are often nonjusticiable.177
Additionally, if courts incorrectly interpret annual appropriations,
Congress has ready and automatic opportunities to clarify its intent
through the annual appropriations process.178 Indeed, if courts defer to
agency interpretations of annual appropriations and Congress does not
like it, it can even prohibit deference to one or all agencies’ annual
appropriations without upsetting the doctrine in other contexts.179
That said, to the extent it does matter, shifting authority to
interpret ambiguities from courts to agencies (Chevron’s delegation
function) generally respects Congress’s primary role in overseeing
agencies’ implementations of annual appropriations laws. Deference
means no third party can undo the results of the political branches’
resolutions of disputes about the meanings of appropriations laws. De
novo review, on the other hand, creates a risk of surprise and
disruption, adding unpredictability to the annual appropriations
process.180
Chevron’s anti-entrenchment function also respects the nature of
the annual appropriations process. As Professor Neil Devins points
out, there is an incongruity between stare decisis and the fact that
annual appropriations are altered or reenacted each year.181 Even
riders like the Hyde Amendment that are perennially reenacted may
have their wording changed in the process—and even if their wording
does not change, the legislative context and intent behind their
enactment likely will.182 Chevron avoids this incongruence by allowing

(D.C. Cir. 2020) (discussing separation of powers implications if there were no external
mechanism to enforce Appropriations Clause against a resistant executive branch).
177. Sohoni, supra note 19, at 1706–07 (explaining barriers to standing in litigation challenging
an unconstitutional expenditure).
178. See Garrett, supra note 157, at 2668–69.
179. See id. at 2656 (suggesting that Congress could plainly express a preference “that courts
serve as the primary interpreters of vague and ambiguous language”).
180. For a discussion of the consequences of unpredictability, see generally Lucy White,
Prudence in Bargaining: The Effect of Uncertainty on Bargaining Outcomes, 62 GAMES & ECON.
BEHAV. 211 (2008) (showing how uncertainty produces bargaining failure), and Oren Bar-Gill,
The Evolution and Persistence of Optimism in Litigation, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 490 (2006) (noting
that “uncertainty and asymmetric information . . . have been invoked to explain bargaining
impasse” and collecting pertinent sources).
181. Devins, supra note 30, at 498–99.
182. Id. at 466–68.
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variations in the interpretation of ambiguous riders when they are
reenacted in multiple years.
Courts should be open, then, to Chevron for annual
appropriations. That leaves the question of how courts should decide
whether to defer in particular cases. The following distinctive
considerations about these unique statutory provisions should inform
this inquiry:
Insisting on notice and comment for annual appropriations may
undermine rather than enhance accountability. The accountability value
ordinarily supports courts favoring (or insisting upon) notice-andcomment rulemaking in deciding whether to defer to agency action.183
Doing so encourages agencies to make their decisions in a way that
features active public participation and explanations. Readers alarmed
to learn about the lack of procedure that so often surrounds
appropriations decisionmaking184 may see this as a context ripe for
judicial encouragement of notice-and-comment rulemaking. Favoring,
or insisting upon, this procedure as a prerequisite to deference for
interpretations of annual appropriations provisions would certainly
encourage proceduralization of appropriations decisions.
I hesitate to endorse such a pro-procedure approach, however,
without more information. The reason for my hesitation is the fact that,
unlike other areas of administrative law, agency decisions about annual
appropriations are checked first and foremost by Congress. Here is a
domain within the administrative state in which Congress remains
active and involved, itself a central, though sometimes controversial,
form of “political accountability” contemplated by the Framers.185
Might judicial encouragement of notice-and-comment rulemaking for
appropriations decisions have unintended consequences for this
arguably salutary arrangement? Could notice-and-comment
rulemaking processes themselves crowd out informal congressional
influence, effectively trading one form of participation (congressional
influence) for another (notice-and-comment rulemaking)?186
183. This consideration is part of Hickman and Nielson’s well-considered and interesting call
to simplify Chevron by insisting, for the most part, on notice-and-comment rulemaking. Hickman
& Nielson, supra note 88, at 965–68.
184. See supra Part I.C.
185. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text (describing the debate about the legitimacy
of congressional influence through the appropriations process).
186. Cf. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 408–10 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussing limitations on
undisclosed congressional involvement in notice-and-comment rulemaking).
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Resolution of these currently unstudied questions is necessary to
decide whether courts should explicitly preference notice-andcomment rulemaking when it comes to annual appropriations on the
ground that doing so would promote accountability.187
Annual appropriations are naturally transitory. The transitory
nature of annual appropriations usually precludes lengthy or
procedurally involved agency consideration. The absence of these
factors is therefore poor evidence that Congress intended courts rather
than agencies to make judgments about the meaning of ambiguous
annual appropriations provisions.
Appropriations directed to a single secretary or agency. When it
comes to annual appropriations, courts must look beyond the
legislative vehicle to the actual provision being interpreted to
determine whether it is administered by a single agency. Although they
may include different sections applicable to different agencies,
appropriations bills are written largely by subcommittees focused on
particular agencies, and appropriations provisions usually apply to a
specific agency or agency head.
D. Doctrinal Basis for Tailoring
Although courts have not yet adopted the bifurcated approach
advocated here, there is doctrinal support for such a move. The
Supreme Court has noted that, in general, in deciding whether to defer
in particular cases “[t]he Court’s choice has been to tailor deference to
variety.”188 I argue here not for “exceptionalism” in appropriations,189
but rather for informed application of the Chevron framework to the
distinctive features of appropriations provisions, especially the
contradictory role of annual and permanent appropriations provisions
in the separation of powers.
Moreover, appropriations have long been understood to be an
area of the law with distinctive features to which existing legal

187. This hesitation does not apply to permanent appropriations; falling outside Congress’s
domain, they do not present the same risk that notice-and-comment procedures could crowd out
congressional influence.
188. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001).
189. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55–56 (2011)
(refusing to create a special deference rule for tax law); City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290,
297, 301 (2013) (refusing to create a special deference rule for “jurisdictional” provisions).
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frameworks must be tailored.190 This is exemplified in administrative
law by the rule stating that decisions on how to spend lump-sum
appropriations are committed to agency discretion by law.191 And it is
exemplified in statutory interpretation by the rule that implied repeals
in annual appropriations are particularly disfavored.192
Indeed, if one were needed, the Appropriations Clause itself
offers a textual basis for a categorical limitation on Chevron in
appropriations law. The clause says that appropriations must be made
“by Law,”193 but Chevron deference for appropriations provisions
would give agencies the power to turn appropriations “on” or “off,”
arguably running afoul of that requirement.194 A nondelegation canon

190. Professor Metzger has recently lamented that courts have often treated appropriations
differently to marginalize them. See Metzger, supra note 13 (manuscript at Part III).
191. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993).
192. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189–90 (1978).
193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
194. The Appropriations Clause insists that Congress approve of all expenditures from the
treasury. Id. The question has not previously been explored, and a historical analysis of Congress’s
delegation of the appropriations power is beyond this Article’s scope. However, it may be
supportable to hold that Congress cannot delegate the appropriations power as it can its other
powers, including its spending power. On this view, Congress could appropriate “such sums as the
Secretary of the Treasury deems essential to respond to a viral pandemic” without running afoul
of the nondelegation doctrine or the Appropriations Clause. In this hypothetical, Congress would
have appropriated the funds and set their amount and available purposes—here, anything
deemed essential by the secretary of the treasury. But, as the argument would go, Congress could
not delegate the power to appropriate to the secretary, such as providing that “the Secretary of
the Treasury shall make such appropriations from the Treasury as she deems essential to respond
to a viral pandemic.” Such a delegation would run afoul of the constitutional requirement that
appropriations be “made by Law.” Id.
The difference between delegating power to influence the purposes to which an
appropriation might be devoted or the amount expended through the appropriation, on the one
hand, and delegating power to appropriate funds, on the other, may seem largely formalistic.
However, it respects, even if in some cases only formally, Congress’s ultimate responsibility and
accountability for the use of taxpayer funds, which is an expressive benefit. Indeed, the distinction
between legal spending—which is legal because it is authorized—and constitutional spending—
which is constitutional because it is appropriated—mattered enough to the Framers that they
addressed the subjects separately, giving Congress authority over spending in one clause of the
Constitution and prohibiting expenditures absent appropriations in another. Compare id. § 8, cl.
1 (granting Congress power to “pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States”), with id. § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”). It also creates avenues to impose
heightened internal restrictions on agencies for undermining Congress’s domain—willful
expenditure without an appropriation is a felony under the Antideficiency Act, for example, but
willfully awarding a grant to a recipient who does not meet statutory conditions of eligibility is
not. Use of Appropriated Funds To Provide Light Refreshments to Non-Fed. Participants at EPA
Confs., 31 Op. O.L.C. 54, 62–71 (2007) (explaining that the Antideficiency Act does not apply to
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that limits deference in appropriations law could thus arguably be
drawn from the Appropriations Clause.195
Doctrinally, the bifurcated approach recommended here is
consistent with courts’ past treatment of Chevron for appropriations,
because cases expressly considering deference have done so with
regard to annual appropriations, not permanent ones.196 This makes
sense even if courts draw a nondelegation canon from the
Appropriations Clause. A court might hold that the existence of the
annual appropriations process is an effective check on executive
discretion, and thus mitigates nondelegation concerns in that context.
Therefore, this process limits the application of any nondelegation
canon forbidding Chevron for appropriations to permanent
appropriations provisions.197
Courts might also look to King v. Burwell as a doctrinal basis for
an anti-deference rule in appropriations, though such a doctrinal move
creates some challenges. King held that the question of whether the
ACA provided for billions in federal subsidies necessary to make the
law work was a “major question” excepted from Chevron.198 The Court
held that the credits were one of the ACA’s “key reforms, involving
billions of dollars in spending each year and affecting the price of
health insurance for millions of people.”199 The credits’ availability thus
posed “a question of deep ‘economic and political significance’ that is
central to th[e] statutory scheme.”200 And because the IRS lacked

spending in violation of legal provision not included in statute creating appropriation). If one
accepts the argument that Congress cannot delegate the appropriations power, it is a logical next
step to say courts should presume Congress delegated authority to turn an appropriation “on”
and “off,” as Chevron for appropriations would entail.
195. Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 n.10 (1986) (noting that in light of the conclusion
that the comptroller general was not a permissible target for delegation, “we have no occasion for
considering appellees’ . . . argument that the assignment of powers to the Comptroller General in
§ 251 violates the delegation doctrine”); Eugene Kontorovich, Discretion, Delegation, and
Defining in the Constitution’s Law of Nations Clause, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1675, 1741–43 (2012)
(arguing in favor of an antidelegation presumption drawn from the Offenses Clause). On
nondelegation canons generally, see Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
315, 330–37 (2000) (describing such canons).
196. See supra Part III.B.
197. For an argument that courts should consider the possibility of congressional oversight
through the annual appropriations process in reviewing nondelegation challenges, see Metzger,
supra note 13, (manuscript at 64).
198. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 485–86 (2015).
199. Id. at 485 (quoting Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)).
200. Id. at 486.
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expertise in health care, the tax credits represented one of those
“extraordinary cases” where the court finds “reason to hesitate before
concluding” that ambiguity in a statute represents an implicit
delegation.201 Could this case represent a path forward for
appropriations?
Sohoni focuses on King’s reference to federal spending and
suggests that the case can be understood to reflect not an expansion of
the “major questions” doctrine but a straightforward rule that “agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutory authority that cause large
amounts of federal spending” should not receive deference.202 That
view is difficult to square with the King opinion. It carves out King’s
reference to the political and personal stakes of the statutory
interpretation question at issue to focus exclusively on the court’s
reference to financial stakes, and leaves significant ambiguity about
how much money is enough to trigger the rule.203 Moreover, by denying
deference not only to appropriations but also to spending provisions
generally, this approach is broader than the approaches identified
previously in a way that contradicts a longstanding body of case law
deferring to agency interpretations of spending provisions.204
Sohoni’s view would, however, provide a doctrinal means to limit
agency discretion to interpret some permanent appropriations should
any court wish to pursue it. If so, I offer two friendly amendments to
Sohoni’s proposed understanding of King as a potential doctrinal path
forward, based on the foregoing. First, rather than the undefined
modifier of “large scale” as the boundary line between spending
ambiguities that receive deference and those that do not, courts should
make the dividing line spending authorities that are funded through
permanent appropriations provisions (reviewed de novo) versus
spending authorities that are subject to annual appropriations
201. Id. at 485 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159
(2000)).
202. Sohoni, supra note 126, at 1432.
203. King might be better read as precluding deference as to ambiguities that entail
particularly significant reliance interests, such as the “deep ‘economic and political significance’”
of the premium tax credits. King, 576 U.S. at 486. As described in the opinion, they played a
foundational role in developing the new ACA marketplaces. The law depended on these
marketplaces in order to attract the investment of both customers and insurers, both of which
were crucial to the credits’ practical and political success.
204. See, e.g., Adirondack Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 740 F.3d 692, 700–01 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(deferring to an agency interpretation of a spending provision in a Medicare statute); see also
supra Part I (describing difference between authorizing statutes and appropriations).
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(reviewed applying Chevron). Second, rather than refuse agency
deference only when an agency reads an appropriation to “cause”
federal spending,205 courts pursuing this approach should refuse
deference to any agency interpretation of an ambiguous permanent
appropriation, whether the agency chooses to spend money or refuses
to spend money. A one-way exception to deference that permits it
when an agency does not spend but grants it when the agency does
spend would have a significant substantive valence against spending.
But it would still permit the executive to leverage the threat of funding
cutoffs to aggrandize its own power and undermine congressional
power.206
CONCLUSION: APPROPRIATION DURATION, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
AND CONGRESS’S DOMAIN
This Article has described Congress’s domain—the world of
legislatively enforced administrative law and congressional influence
made possible by each chamber’s unicameral power to refuse funding
for any agency or program that relies on annual appropriations. It has
also explained how permanent appropriations provisions shrink
Congress’s domain. This dynamic has implications for the
incorporation of appropriations into administrative law doctrine.
When it comes to Chevron for appropriations, it means that deference
for annual appropriations respects congressional authority but that
deference for permanent appropriations undermines it. Thus, this
Article recommends a bifurcated approach to Chevron for
appropriations.
The dichotomy between annual and permanent appropriations
has implications beyond the narrow but important question of the
applicability of Chevron to appropriations. One such implication is the
possibility that discretionary permanent appropriations may implicate
heightened nondelegation doctrine concerns drawn in part from the
Appropriations Clause. Another possibility that future scholarship
might productively consider is whether Lincoln v. Vigil’s207 holding that
agency decisions about how to spend lump-sum appropriations are not
reviewable in court under the APA should be limited to the annual
205. Sohoni, supra note 126, at 1432.
206. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (describing the normative assumption that an
interpretive rule should strive to avoid favoring or disfavoring particular substantive outcomes).
207. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993).
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appropriations context, given the relevance of congressional oversight
in that context to the reasoning in that case and the separation of
powers implications of long-term appropriations.208 Similarly,
Congress’s enforcement tools in the annual appropriations space may
impact the need for legislative standing to enforce the Appropriations
Clause in this context.
Finally, moving beyond doctrinal questions, future scholarship
could helpfully explore and problematize the extent to which the rules
for agency behavior created and enforced by Congress through the
annual appropriations process are consistent with, undermine, or
otherwise interact with the rules for agency behavior created by the
APA and enforced by the courts—and vice versa.209 As scholars,
judges, and policymakers work to understand, negotiate, and shape the
many legal and extralegal influences on the administrative state, they
should remain mindful that changes that affect agencies’ dependence
on annual appropriations redraw the boundaries of Congress’s domain.

208. See supra Part II.C.
209. Scholarship might also consider how Congress’s control of agencies through the
appropriations process interacts not just with statutory administration law but also with internal
administrative law. See generally Metzger & Stack, supra note 61 (describing executive branch
rules governing the behavior of agencies).

